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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will seek to shed light on the broader issue of whether or not the United States 
can enhance homeland security by fighting terrorism abroad, in the Philippines 
specifically, and help deepen our understanding of the dynamics at play.  It will do this 
first by examining the key terrorist organizations operating in the southern Philippines, 
providing an understanding of what motivates them, how they operate, and how terrorist 
activity in this region impacts U.S. homeland security.  Analysis of U.S. policies and 
efforts to minimize this activity will reveal whether or not they have enjoyed any measure 
of success.  The efforts put forth by the United States over the past nine years have been 
significant, involved a sustained U.S. presence in the affected areas, and cost U.S. 
taxpayers billions of dollars.  The second front in the global war on terrorism has not 
produced a direct attack on U.S. interests since 9/11.  Additionally, the focus on the Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) has produced definitive results, but terrorist attacks in the region 
persist, threatening the stability of the Philippines and U.S. interests there.  This thesis 
concludes that, while the United States has enjoyed some successes, clearly it has yet to 
confront the root causes of the problems in the southern Philippines.  While the United 
States aggressively pursued the ASG, as recently as 2008, a breakdown in the peace 
process talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) resulted in displacement of hundreds of thousands of residents in the southern 
Philippines.  Another breakdown could likely end up having history repeat itself unless 
the United States adopts a more comprehensive strategy that addresses the root causes 
underlying the separatist movements.   
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Has the United States’ efforts to combat terrorism abroad enhanced homeland 
security?  Have these efforts in the southern Philippines made the U.S. homeland more 
secure?  If so, how have they done so?   
This thesis will seek to shed light on the broader issue of whether or not the 
United States can enhance homeland security by fighting terrorism abroad and help 
deepen our understanding of the dynamics at play.  It will do this first by examining the 
key terrorist organizations operating in the southern Philippines, providing an 
understanding of what motivates them, how they operate, and how terrorist activity in 
this region impacts U.S. homeland security.  Analysis of U.S. policies and efforts to 
minimize this activity will reveal whether or not they have enjoyed any measure of 
success.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
United States’ counterterrorism policies in the Philippines are important to 
analyze because history has shown terrorist activity that has taken place there has 
jeopardized U.S. homeland security.  The most prominent example of this sort of activity 
is the so-called “Bojinka plot.”  In 1995, Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, 
with financial assistance from al Qaeda, planned an attack against a dozen U.S. 
commercial aircraft departing from Manila.1  They also planned to crash an airliner into 
CIA headquarters.  These acts directly threatened U.S. homeland security.   
The Ramzi Yousef case clearly demonstrates links between the Philippines as a 
safe haven for terrorists and as a concrete threat to the U.S. homeland.  Although it 
occurred well before 9/11, this case is the most well-known direct evidence of terror 
activity planned against the United States in the Philippines.  Since then, however, other 
evidence has emerged.  In particular, links between al Qaeda and a major separatist 
                                                 
1 The 9/11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004, 146–7, www.9-11commission.gov/report/ 
911Report.pdf (accessed October 4, 2009). 
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movement in the southern Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), as well 
as between the MILF and the largest terrorist network in Southeast Asia, known as 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), have also been discovered since 9/11.  In 2002, Philippine military 
forces repeatedly uncovered al Qaeda cells operating training camps in Mindanao.2  This 
thesis will provide a thorough analysis of those cases.  It will also critically review 
America’s counterterrorism policy of focusing on a smaller but arguably more violent 
separatist movement in the southern Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).  
In 2002, President Bush ordered U.S. military forces into the Philippines in an 
effort to combat terrorism offshore.  Since then, the U.S. has undertaken a wide range of 
efforts to combat terrorism in the Philippines, through both military and State Department 
channels.  Initiatives, such as the Philippine Defense Reform Program and the Capability 
Upgrade Program, provided much needed training and equipment to the Philippine 
military.  However, these successes have been limited.  Much of the military effort to 
date has centered on suppressing activity by the ASG, the smallest of the major Muslim 
militant groups in the Philippines, which has rarely targeted American interests, and has 
the weakest ties to JI.  In spite of the linkages to terrorist activity, the United States does 
not list the MILF as a terrorist organization. 
Today, ASG has largely been contained and poses no serious threat to U.S. 
homeland security.  However, the government of the Philippines has yet to negotiate 
peace in the nearly 30-year existence of the MILF.  Talks are underway, and a fragile 
ceasefire remains in place.  In spite of that, the southern Philippines remain an area 
outside the span of control of the government.  For example, in the run-up to the May 
2010 elections, a local militia massacred 32 journalists in Maguindanao in  
November 2009.  While the government has arrested scores of suspects, the family in 
charge of the militia retains control over large sections of the province, including local 
law enforcement and judges.3 
                                                 
2 James J. F. Forest, The Making of a Terrorist:  Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes, Vol 2 
(Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006). 
3 Norimitsu Onishi, “Filipino Politicians Wield Private Armies, Despite Ban,” The New York Times, 
February 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/21/world/asia/ 21phils.html? ref=asia&pagewanted= 
print (accessed February 23, 2010). 
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C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
While the United States has provided millions of dollars in aid to the Philippine 
military and government through the U.S. military and organizations such as USAID, it 
appears to have done so without a comprehensive strategy.   
Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States adopted an aggressive approach to 
combating terrorism and defeating al Qaeda.  Since al Qaeda dispersed globally, the 
United States could not focus on the organization in the same manner as it would a 
conventional military force.  Instead, America chose to focus on known areas where al 
Qaeda and its affiliates were concentrated.  The targets of this policy were not limited to 
the Middle East and Afghanistan.  In fact, the Bush Administration declared Southeast 
Asia to be the “second front” in the “Global War on Terrorism.”  And in this region, the 
Philippines received the most attention.  The American military worked with the 
Philippine military, training Filipino soldiers to engage in the enforcement aspects of the 
strategy.  The combination of these two elements, they believed, would eventually win 
over the population and erode support for the Islamic extremist factions that were finding 
safe havens for training in the southern Philippines and challenging the Philippine state, a 
staunch ally of the United States.  U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the Philippines has 
included nonmilitary components, too.  These programs are intended to win the support 
of the population and wean them off of support provided by terrorist groups. 
However, the military and nonmilitary aspects of U.S. assistance appear 
piecemeal and unconnected to a broader strategy of regional stability.  Many military 
programs do not appear to be coordinated with programs that USAID and other 
organizations’ support.  American policies may not have been as effective as they could 
have been because of lack of interagency coordination and execution rather than lack of 
funding.  The apparently compartmentalized approach to these problems embraced by the 
main U.S. military effort, Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF – P), 
the primary U.S. State Department initiative, USAID, the government of the Philippines 
and other organizations appears to have hindered U.S. counterterrorism efforts.    
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As a result, this thesis will hypothesize that U.S. counterterrorism policy has been 
compartmentalized and therefore, it has been far less effective than it could be.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior to 9/11, the United States generally treated terrorism as a criminal act to be 
punished within the U.S. legal system.  The end of the Cold War reduced the need for 
continued military buildup in Southeast Asia, resulting in the elimination of the 
“American-led security network in Asia.”4  While the United States continued to engage 
in military and diplomatic activities with the Philippines, these focused primarily on 
countering the influence of China in the region, not counterterrorism.  During that time, 
terrorists increased their presence in the Philippines and used lawless regions of the south 
as a springboard to train and launch attacks from.  After 9/11, President Bush changed the 
U.S. grand strategy in Southeast Asia to focus on counterterrorism efforts, especially in 
the Philippines.  There are varying viewpoints on the success of this strategy in 
contemporary literature. 
Some view the terrorism in the Philippines as a threat to U.S. interests and 
consider the change in U.S. strategy in the Philippines after 9/11 to be correct both in 
assigning a high level of importance to this front and in its utilization of military means.  
The United States went from treating terrorist attacks as criminal acts to considering them 
acts of war.  As a result, military operations ensued in Afghanistan and later Iraq, 
financial assets were frozen, the United States engaged in training programs in the 
Philippines and elsewhere, and many other activities at home and abroad were designed 
to prevent terrorist attacks from taking place on the U.S. homeland.  Strategy evolved 
from a reactive approach, waiting for an event to occur then responding, to a proactive 
approach, targeting terrorists and suspected terrorists, supporters and sympathizers on 
American terms and, when possible, before attacks took place.  The 9/11 Commission 
Report, released in 2003, postulated that Southeast Asia would be the “second front” in 
the global war on terrorism.  Anticipating the conclusions of that report, shortly after 
9/11, the U.S. and Philippine governments heightened cooperation efforts with one 
                                                 
4 John Baylis, et al., The Globalization of World Politics, 4th Ed., (Oxford University Press:  2008). 
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another, primarily aimed at targeting ASG but largely ignoring possible threats posed by 
the MILF.  The United States sought and received support from the Philippines for its 
position to go after al Qaeda offensively there.  After 9/11, the United States gained 
strategic port rights in the Philippines.5  However, the increased U.S. military presence 
remained contentious among Filipinos due to America’s colonial and post-colonial 
history there.6  It is apparent that both states have gone to great lengths to address 
terrorism in the Philippines, in both cases based on principles and not necessarily on the 
whimsical trends in public opinion.  
Scholars generally agree that Islamic militant groups in the southern Philippines 
have been a problem for decades.  Today, there are three main groups that share similar 
grievances, pursue their aims through violent attacks on the Philippine government, and 
pose a threat to the United States.  McKenna explains that the MILF came about in 1984 
as a result of events in Cotabato, precipitating a general mindset of Muslim separatism in 
Mindanao.7  However, the roots of the MILF are much deeper and some argue that it was 
formed as early as 1981, as a breakaway group from the original Muslim separatist 
organization in Mindanao, the Moro-National Liberation Front (MNLF). 
The struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims in the southern Philippines goes 
back to the turn of the twentieth century when colonial rule transferred from Spain to the 
United States at the conclusion of the Spanish American War.  The Spanish largely 
ignored the Muslims and the southern Philippines and did not try to assimilate them into 
their colonial empire, but Americans favored a different approach.  The United States, 
and later the independent Philippines, insisted on assimilating Mindanao into the 
archipelago’s unitary government.  In the 1950s and 1960s, the government of the 
Philippines gave financial incentives to Christians to move to Mindanao in an effort to 
                                                 
5 Robert S. Ross and Aaron L. Friedberg, “Here Be Dragons” National Interest (September–October 
2009). 
6 Eni H. Faleomavaega, “Japan’s Changing Role,” Political Transcript from House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, Washington, DC, June 
29, 2009. 
7 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels:  Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the 
Southern Philippines, (Berkeley, University of California Press: 1998), 281. 
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dilute the Muslim population there, relieve overcrowding in the Luzon area, provide an 
incentive for landless Christians to reject the Communist insurgency, and reward 
Christian politicians and their clan members.  This Philippine government policy forced 
Moro-Muslims off their lands, resulting in newcomers to the region possessing 
unprecedented wealth and control over the still predominantly Muslim population.  As a 
result of these dynamics, increased abuses at the hands of government-sponsored militias, 
and lack of justice through the judicial system, disgruntled Muslims bonded together and 
formed the MNLF in 1972, determined to annex the southern Philippines and establish a 
separate Moro state.8  Following a number of violent revolts, the government and MNLF 
reached a series of agreements through the years.  The establishment of the Autonomous 
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) appeased MNLF leaders in 1996 and they largely 
abandoned further anti-government violence.  By then however, MNLF had spawned a 
number of spin-off movements, most notably the MILF and, in 1990, the ASG.   
Even with the government agreeing to establish the ARMM, Islamic militancy 
continued to fester in Mindanao, growing in size and aggressiveness.  Jemaah Islamiyah 
elements are especially of concern given their direct ties to al Qaeda, which considers 
them and the MILF to be its “operational wing in Southeast Asia.”9  They regard the 
southern Philippines as a “safe haven” from which to train and operate.10  Additionally, 
Philippine military forces have uncovered al Qaeda cells operating training camps in 
Mindanao repeatedly, as recently as 2002.11  Following the resignation of President 
Joseph Estrada in 2001, the government began negotiations with the MILF, which has led 
to sporadic ceasefires and later reinitiating of hostilities.  The Philippine government 
                                                 
8 “Special Report:  Philippine Counter-Terrorism Campaign Faces a Challenge Unsuited to Major 
High-Tech Systems,” 2.  Moro is a multiethnic identity comprised of members of 13 distinct language 
groups whose homeland is in the Southern Philippines, primarily in the Mindanao-Sulu region.  
9 Peter Chalk et al., “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia:  A Net Assessment,” RAND 
National Defense Research Institute, 2009, 92. 
10 Preeti Bhattacharji, “Terrorism Havens:  Philippines,” Council on Foreign Relations Online, June 1, 
2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/9365/ (accessed October 14, 2009); Andrew Feickert, “U.S. Military 
Operations in the Global War on Terrorism:  Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia,” CRS 
Report for Congress, January 20, 2006, 19; Francis T. Miko, “Removing Terrorist Sactuaries:  The 9/11 
Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, February 11, 2005, 15. 
11 Forest, The Making of a Terrorist, 190. 
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continues to negotiate with the MILF, but it has problems constraining some of the more 
radical elements of its organization from aiding al Qaeda affiliates, as well as upholding 
and implementing agreements it has made due to Filipino-Christian pressures to maintain 
the unequal status quo.12  Philippine military forces arrested JI members operating 
training camps in Mindanao in 2003 and 2004.13  In 2009, Larry Niksch indicated the 
JI/MILF connection endures and has increased.14  It makes sense that international 
terrorist organizations look to the southern Philippines, given the professionally 
organized training program operated by the MILF throughout the region that loosely 
parallels what one would expect to find in a state-run professional military.15  Based on 
this information, it is apparent that terrorism has had a foothold in Mindanao, at least 
since the 1960s. 
However, other scholars believe foreign Islamic extremist elements have 
disappeared from the region, and that terrorism in the Philippines is not a significant 
problem.  RAND believes the JI/MILF connection has all but disappeared since 2004.16  
Niksch summed this up best in 2007.  On the one hand, the MILF condemned the 9/11 
attacks and rebuffed the al Qaeda fatwa to operate against the U.S.  On the other hand, 
evidence indicates elements of the MILF have cooperated with JI and Abu Sayyaf.17  In 
other words, Niksch disassociates JI from al Qaeda.   
The United States has assisted the Philippine government in the form of military 
and nonmilitary aid, in support of existing U.S. counterterrorism policies.  In 2004, 
America trained Filipino troops to fight against terrorist elements in the south.18  
                                                 
12 Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesians on Philippine Island:  
Persistence Startles Officials in Manila,” The Washington Post, November 17, 2003.  
13 Forest, The Making of a Terrorist, 191. 
14 Lunn and Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines:  Background and U.S. Relations,” 9. 
15 “Special Report:  Philippine Counter-Terrorism Campaign Faces a Challenge Unsuited to Major 
High-Tech Systems,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily (February 5, 2002). 
16 Peter Chalk et al., “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia:  A Net Assessment,” 44. 
17 Larry A. Niksch, “Abu Sayyaf:  Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation,” CRS 
Report for Congress, July 26, 2007, 7. 
18 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia; Analyzing Regional Security 
Strategies,” International Security (Winter 2008). 
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Following 9/11 and the declaration of Southeast Asia as the second front, U.S. foreign aid 
to the Philippines increased substantially, with total foreign aid doubling between 2001 
and 2002 and with the Philippines receiving the largest amount of U.S. military 
assistance in the region.  U.S. military assistance to the Philippines in 2005 grew from 
$30 million to $55 million, nearly doubling the amount of money the United States 
provided to the Philippines in a one-year time span.19  These numbers have remained at 
peak levels since then.  The United States has spent hundreds of millions of dollars to 
fund its counterterrorism policies, but it is questionable if those dollars have been spent in 
the most efficient manner possible. 
A third school of thought believes terrorism in the Philippines is a problem for the 
United States that needs to be addressed, but that the U.S. policies have failed.  Other 
observers see two shortcomings in U.S. strategies after 9/11.  First, the U.S. strategy of 
focusing exclusively on diminishing the influence of the ASG focuses on the wrong 
target.  Direct U.S. military aid to date has been earmarked for use against ASG only.20  
The ASG poses little threat to the United States and is considered to be a minor player in 
the problem of terrorism in the southern Philippines.  In spite of the many connections the 
MILF has displayed with other international terrorist organizations, the United States, at 
the request of the Philippine government, does not list the group as an identified terrorist 
organization.  As a result, most terrorist groups in the southern Philippines retain most of 
their capabilities.  The National Counterterrorism Center reports the Philippines ranks 
eleventh globally in fatalities by country due to terrorist attacks and ninth in kidnappings.  
Additional research will likely indicate a disparate proportion of these take place in the 
southern Philippines.  Given these numbers, U.S. military solutions implemented to date 
seem to have had little effect in reducing the impact of Islamic militancy. 
The second major weakness concerns the lack of coordination between the 
military and nonmilitary parts of U.S. policy.  While the U.S. has dedicated millions of 
dollars to lure MILF members out of the organization and into stable jobs within larger 
                                                 
19 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia; Analyzing Regional Security 
Strategies,” International Security (Winter 2008). 
20 Ibid., 180. 
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Mindanao society, USAID has led this initiative without full coordination with U.S. 
military efforts.21  As a result, U.S.-trained Filipino forces often carry out missions 
against the same people USAID aims to convert.  Most likely, government leaders take 
much of this aid and line their pockets with it as well, depriving the larger population the 
benefits the aid is designed to provide.  Additionally, the American military strategy to 
train the Philippine military to take offensive action against insurgents fails to address the 
rampant corruption contributing to the problems in Mindanao.22  In many cases, corrupt 
government officials can easily influence poorly paid and overworked military forces and 
law enforcement officials with the financial aid provided by the United States.   
These two weaknesses have been exacerbated by problems on the Philippine side.  
First, the ARMM remains the most impoverished region in the entire country; across 
virtually every economic data point provided, it ranks last in all regions of the 
Philippines.23  This is a testament that the aid provided by the United States has failed to 
produce the expected results.  Second, the Philippine military’s strategies may hinder 
American counterterrorism policies.  The Philippine Army prefers a softer “hearts and 
minds” approach in Mindanao, which RAND argues has decreased violence.24  Manila 
gave significant concessions to the MILF, agreeing in 2007 to significantly expand the 
borders of the proposed Bangsamoro Juridical Entity, which provides for a primarily 
Muslim autonomous region in Mindanao.25  Recognition of the MILF and efforts to work 
with it for a peace agreement have acted as a deterrent, at least for the group at large, 
 
 
                                                 
21 Catharin Dalpino, “Southeast Asia in 2008:  Challenges Within and Without,” Southeast Asian 
Affairs 2009, (2009):  10. 
22 Peter Chalk et al., “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia:  A Net Assessment,” xv–xvii. 
23 Arsenio Balisacan et al., “Regional Development Dynamics and Decentralization in the Philippines:  
Ten Lessons From a ‘Fast Starter,’” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 25, No. 3, December 2008, 303–10. 
24 Peter Chalk et al., “The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia:  A Net Assessment,” 141–2. 
25 Allen Hicken, “The Philippines in 2008:  Peace-building, War-fighting and Crisis Management,” 
Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 1 (January–February 2009):  193. 
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against harboring al Qaeda affiliates.26  However, as was the case with the MNLF in the 
mid-1990s, off-shoots of the MILF continue to engage in violence against the 
government.   
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
A case-study approach to U.S. counterterrorism policies in the Philippines will 
shed light on the broader U.S. policy of fighting terrorists abroad in order to protect the 
homeland.  Cases will include the ASG, JI, the MILF, and U.S. policy toward them.  An 
analysis of current U.S. policies will demonstrate if they have had the desired effect of 
combating terrorism in the Philippines.  In particular, analysis will determine if the 
decision to engage only the ASG with military force has been effective.  It will also 
demonstrate if adherence to the Philippine government strategy of cooperating with the 
MILF has produced results in combating terrorism.  Additional analysis will explore the 
effectiveness of USAID actions and policies in the Philippines.  This thesis will also 
comprehensively assess if the individual strategies could be more effective if they were 
integrated into a single, overarching strategy. 
Sufficient information in the form of secondary sources exists to conduct an 
analysis of U.S. counterterrorism policy in the Philippines and draw conclusions on the 
level of success those policies have enjoyed.  Secondary sources will include U.S., 
Australian, and Philippine government reports, reports by organizations, such as the 
International Crisis Group and Asia Foundation, and academic articles and books.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis, analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the 
Philippines to improve homeland security, will be broken into three main sections, each 
one building on the previous section to culminate in providing the reader with a full 
understanding of threats to U.S. homeland security stemming from terrorist activity in the 
Philippines, U.S. counterterrorism policies as they apply to the Philippines, and an 
analysis of whether or not these policies have worked.   
                                                 
26 Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism:  It Can be Done,” 
International Security (Winter 2005–2006).  
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The first section will describe terrorist activity in the Philippines organized by 
cases.  It will provide an understanding of the various terrorist groups that have operated 
in the Philippines and the ones that exist today.  It will also highlight the ties these 
terrorist groups have with more international terrorist organizations, especially JI and al 
Qaeda, which pose a threat to the U.S. homeland.  The second section will explore U.S. 
counterterrorism policies in the Philippines.  It will define U.S. counterterrorism policies 
in the Philippines as they relate to the overarching U.S. counterterrorism strategy that 
aims to take the fight to terrorists before they reach the U.S. homeland.  Next, the section 
will lay out military and nonmilitary strategy.  The final section will analyze U.S. 
counterterrorism policies.  The ASG remains alive, peace with the MILF elusive, and JI 
continues to evolve, leaving one to wonder if U.S. policy has failed, or that more work 
needs to be done.  Analysis will determine if there are any lessons that can be learned for 
the next phase of the fight.  The thesis will conclude by tying the previous sections 
together to give the reader a complete understanding of the complex issues presented.  It 
will also provide a section on policy recommendations that offer viable alternatives to the 
status quo of U.S. counterterrorism policies in the Philippines. 
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Terrorist activity in the Philippines has taken various forms, beginning with the 
formation of the MNLF in 1976 and evolving into the key players that exist today.  The 
different terrorist organizations have spawned additional movements as demands have 
changed and as the government has responded through waging state violence and offering 
concessions.  Initially, terrorist groups operating in the Philippines fought for a separate 
Muslim state in the southern region and to correct decades of neglect and unfulfilled 
promises by the government.  While the government took some steps toward this goal in 
the 1990s through the establishment of the ARMM, newer movements rejected these 
concessions, believing the MNLF compromised too much in the name of peace with the 
government, and continue to fight for independence.  In waging this fight, more recent 
movements have accepted support from international terrorist organizations, especially JI 
and al Qaeda, a move that made these movements more formidable while bargaining for 
peace with the government.  The United States recognized the threat international 
terrorist ties in the Philippines poses to its homeland security after 9/11.   
Muslims in the southern Philippines enjoyed relative independence for centuries.  
For centuries, the Spanish failed to spread their colonial roots into Mindanao and farther 
south, despite repeated attempts to do so.  The United States gained control of the 
archipelago at the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in the early 20th century.  
The United States promised the Philippines eventual independence but also sought to 
assimilate the entire archipelago into a single nation.  When independence arrived after 
the conclusion of World War II, the Muslims did not attain a separatist state.  Violent 
efforts to assimilate the Muslim masses by the government prompted the organization of 
Muslim groups willing to use violence themselves to achieve what nonviolence had failed 
to, most notably the MNLF.  When the MNLF began negotiating with the Philippine 
government, it alienated some members of the organization, resulting in the formation of 
a number of breakaway groups, most notably the MILF in 1984 and the ASG in 1991.  
Further steps by the Philippine government in response to these organizations facilitated 
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the rise of international terrorist influence there.  This influence remains today, although 
it appears to have waned in recent years.  While fragmented for decades, the Muslims 
eventually joined forces in opposition to the new Philippine government, demanding 
independence.  This struggle continues today, with thousands of lives lost on both sides 
left as a legacy in the struggle for this nation to find its identity.  In recent months, 
however, Filipinos have come closer than ever at reaching a peaceful resolution to this 
decades’ long conflict.   
Following 9/11, U.S. policy targeted ASG.  Since its formation, ASG quickly 
moved to implement some of the most violent tactics seen to date to achieve its initial 
goals of a separate Muslim state, sparking interest in the organization in the mid-1990s 
by JI and al Qaeda.  A series of high-profile kidnappings for ransom provoked outcries of 
protest by the international community.  Since then, however, ASG appears to have 
degenerated into a low-profile organized crime group more bent on gaining monetarily 
than pursuing its original separatist goals.  Although not as violent, the MILF is the 
largest Muslim separatist group in the Philippines.  For decades, they have developed and 
run training camps used by terrorist groups throughout Southeast Asia, most notably JI.  
Though initially dismissed by the Philippine government as a fringe movement, the 
MILF remains formidable today and the government has sought a permanent peace with 
the organization for a number of years, a process that continues today.  Although JI 
originated in Indonesia and maintains its main force there, it and other terrorists have 
maintained a presence in the Philippines, utilizing it as a safe haven to train and plan 
operations from. 
B. A HISTORY OF MUSLIM OPPRESSION 
The Philippines endured 300 years of Spanish imperialism before the United 
States defeated them in war and claimed the island nation as its own.  By the time the 
Spanish arrived in the 15th century Islam had already taken hold in Mindanao and the 
surrounding islands.27 The natives would not allow the Spanish to spread Christianity.  
                                                 
27 Charles Frake, “Abu Sayyaf:  Displays of Violence and the Proliferation of Contested Identities 
Among Philippine Muslims,” American Anthropologist, Vol. 100, No. 1 (March 1998): 43. 
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As a result, the Spanish branded them with the “Moro” label, taken from their wars with 
Spanish Muslims, the Moors.28  The Spanish recruited the newly converted Catholics to 
fight against the Moros, delineating a divide between two cultures that had lived together 
in relative peace prior to the arrival of the Spanish.29  Following the Spanish-American 
War, the United States publicly proclaimed it would ultimately grant the Philippines 
independence.  Its actions, however, especially early in the 1900s, seemed to contrast this 
promise.  The Muslim population in the southern Philippines especially felt the pain of 
American influence.  While the Spanish generally left the Muslim areas alone during its 
colonial period and focused its efforts on converting the rest of the nation to Catholicism, 
the Americans from the onset believed assimilation of the Muslims into a nationalist 
society would be necessary for independence.   
When the United States assumed imperialist control as part of the concessions 
ending the Spanish American War, it promised the Philippines it would eventually grant 
it independence.  Muslims lobbied the United States for independence, hoping it would 
form a separate Muslim state in modern day Mindanao.30  Subversive tactics on the part 
of the United States (and the Spanish before the war) eroded Muslim sovereignty to a 
point that, in 1946, when the Philippines did achieve independence, the U.S. denied 
Muslims autonomy, or even the opportunity to remain a protectorate of the U.S.31  The 
Muslims attempted to work with the Christian Filipinos, even going so far as to refer to 
themselves as “Filipino-Muslims” instead of “Moros.”32  A series of moves by the 
nascent Philippine government in the 1940s and 1950s to assimilate the Muslim 
population instead further alienated the Muslim masses, in spite of complicit support of 
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30 Ibid. 
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these policies by the Muslim elites working with the government in Manila.33  From 
there, the government of the Philippines took direct action to assimilate the Muslims into 
the rest of the country, but did so without concern for their cultures, history, or way of 
life.  Public education ignored their past and the rest of the population generally treated 
the Muslims as second class citizens.34  Their experiences in the 1960s mirrored those of 
African Americans in the U.S. in many ways during that time.  This culminated with the 
Jabidah Massacre, where Philippine military forces executed at least 28 Muslim recruits 
when they refused to participate in violence against Muslim Malays.  The failure of the 
government to prosecute any of the known executioners or hold anyone accountable 
galvanized what had previously been loose pockets of opposition.35  The Jabidah 
Massacre planted the seeds of insurrection that eventually led to the rise of the MNLF 
and more than four decades of separatist violence. 
C. INSURGENCY ORIGINS 
Philippine government actions galvanized Muslim opposition.  The 1968 Jabidah 
Massacre acted as a catalyst to foment formal opposition by the Muslims against the 
government, culminating in President Ferdinand Marcos’ implementation of martial law 
in 1972.36  As a result, disgruntled Muslims bonded together and formed the MNLF in 
1972, determined to annex the southern Philippines and establish a separate Moro state.37  
Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim rose to lead the MNLF.38  In keeping with its separatist 
identity, the MNLF and its followers reverted to the old practice of referring to 
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themselves as “Moros” and no longer “Filipino-Muslims.”39  MNLF opposition produced 
conflict with the military and tragedy followed, with estimates of up to 80,000 killed, 1 
million homeless and as many as 300,000 that sought refuge in neighboring Malaysia.40  
Following a number of violent revolts, the government and the MNLF reached a series of 
agreements through the years.   
Having grown weary from the fighting, both sides desired peace, and peace talked 
began.  In 1976, the Tripoli Agreement established an autonomous region in four 
provinces, satiating some of the opposition leaders’ desire for independence.41  While the 
Tripoli Agreement marked an important milestone as the first real negotiations between 
the Philippine government and Muslim militants, at the same time it created divisions 
within the MNLF.  Not all Muslims were satisfied.  Salamat challenged Misuari for 
leadership of the MNLF as a result of his perceived caving in to the government, but 
failed.42  Misuari had gained assurances from Marcos that the government would 
establish an autonomous region that Misuari would govern and personally benefit from.43  
Salamat led a breakaway group in 1977 that, in 1984, formally established itself as the 
MILF.44  The MILF rejected the Tripoli Agreement, and later rejected its successor in 
1996, which expanded the autonomous region, calling it the ARMM, but not enough to 
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minimal national government intervention, as well as some form of reparations to 
account for past injustices.46  In 1990, a smaller but arguably more violent separatist 
movement formed in the southern Philippines, the ASG.    
The government of the Philippines did not consider the MILF a serious threat to 
the peace process until after the 1996 agreement, when violence spawned by the MILF 
continued.  For many Muslims, ARMM has failed to produce the promised results; it has 
not provided the independence to govern as promised, continues to deny promised 
representation in the national government and has not yet addressed land ownership 
issues.47  These facts empowered the MILF even more and the government entered into 
negotiations with them in 1997.48  Between 1997 and 2001, the government, while 
negotiating, often sent military forces into Mindanao and MILF strongholds in an effort 
to contain them.49  In 2001, the government expelled Misuari from his position as 
governor of the ARMM and charged him with sedition after he led a revolt against a 
military outpost.50  No real movement on a renewed peace process was possible up to this 
point.  
D. ROOT CAUSES 
Subversive tactics on the part of the United States (and the Spanish before the 
war) eroded Muslim sovereignty to a point that, in 1946, when the Philippines did 
achieve independence, the United States denied Muslims autonomy, or even the 
opportunity to remain a protectorate of the U.S.51  From there, the government of the 
Philippines took direct action to assimilate the Muslims into the rest of the country, but 
did so without concern for their cultures, history, or way of life.  Public education ignored 
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their past and the rest of the population generally treated the Muslims as second class 
citizens.52  In the 1950s and 1960s, the government of the Philippines gave financial 
incentives to Christians to move to Mindanao in an effort to dilute the Muslim population 
there.  In the short term, this would reduce the concentration of the Muslim population in 
the south and in the long term intermarriage could hopefully erode the hostilities between 
the two religious cultures.  These newcomers possessed unprecedented wealth and 
control over the still predominantly Muslim population.   
The root cause of the issue is land ownership.  Christians own most of the land 
today even though Muslims lived on and worked the land for hundreds of years before 
Christians moved there in the early 20th century.53  The transplanted Christian 
landowners vehemently resist efforts to grant land rights to the Muslims, and have 
significant clout in the national government preventing movement in this area.54  While 
Muslim elites remained complicit and even supported these government actions, the 
relative deprivation on the part of the Muslim masses grew increasingly pronounced 
during this period.  The government successfully bought off MNLF leadership beginning 
with the Tripoli agreement.  At the same time, extreme poverty persisted in the ARMM, a 
result of neglect by both the government and the Muslim elites.  As a result, government 
failed to maintain law and order in the ARMM, and instead local militias grew and 
controlled the region.  When the government acted to combat insurgents, this fact made it 
exceedingly difficult since the military could not count on local police for support.  These 
conditions in particular spawned the rise of Abubakr Janjalani, leader of the ASG.  He 
grew up in a poor household and studied in a fundamentalist mosque, distinguishing him 
and the ASG from previous separatist groups.  He successfully recruited hundreds of 
mostly poor Muslims into his organization in the early 1990s.   
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E. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST TIES 
Extremist groups outside the Philippines recognized the national government’s 
lack of control over the southern Philippines and sought to exploit those conditions to 
further their own goals.  Al Qaeda has been extensively linked to both ASG and the 
MILF.55  The region’s instability continues to plague the government, as it works with 
MILF to come to a peace agreement.  In pursuit of that peace, the government decided 
not to take action against rogue elements of MILF that allowed JI to operate and train in 
Mindanao.56  Given the fact that the MILF is a breakaway group itself, it comes as no 
surprise that fringe elements take actions such as this.  To its credit, MILF leadership has 
demonstrated to the government that these elements do not represent the group as a 
whole, and they have made a concerted effort to stamp out this opposition.   
History has shown that terrorist activity, which has taken place in the Philippines, 
has jeopardized its security and spilled over from being an internal problem to being an 
international problem.  A very prominent example of this sort of activity is the so-called 
“Bojinka plot.”  In 1995, Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, with financial 
assistance from al Qaeda, planned an attack against a dozen U.S. commercial aircraft 
departing from Manila.57  They successfully conducted a dry run and a test run in a single 
aircraft, all planned from an apartment in Manila.58  Only in a chance encounter did 
Philippine police come across the apartment filled with explosives to be used on multiple 
commercial aircraft.  They also planned to assassinate Pope John Paul II and to crash an 
airliner into CIA headquarters in the United States.  Yousef successfully evaded 
authorities for years before they finally caught him in 2002.  This act directly served as a 
catalyst for the current U.S. presence in the southern Philippines that came about in early 
2002 after the United States declared Southeast Asia the “second front” in their global 
war on terrorism.  
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However, links between the organizations continue to perpetuate.  Throughout the 
1990s and 2000s, the Philippine military uncovered evidence of material support 
provided by JI and al Qaeda to the MILF and the ASG.  The military also has reason to 
believe JI and al Qaeda received training on terrorist operations in the numerous training 
camps run by the MILF throughout the southern Philippines.  For example, in November 
2009, Mohd Azmi Ali was arrested in Singapore for allegedly swearing allegiance to the 
MILF in 1997 after joining JI in 1989.  While training at a MILF camp in Mindanao he 
also allegedly provided funds to the MILF.59  In spite of these associations, the United 
States, at the request of the Philippine government, has declined to list MILF as a terrorist 
organization.  However, this could be a strategy on the part of the MILF to avoid the 
repercussions of global counterterrorism efforts.60  The Philippine government has 
worked extensively with the U.S., and international organizations, to help broker a peace 
agreement. 
F. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
Islamic militant groups in the southern Philippines have been a problem for 
decades.  Today, there are three main groups that share similar grievances, pursue their 
aims through violent attacks on the Philippine government, and pose a threat to the global 
community due to the fact that they have opened the door for larger, more dangerous 
international terrorist organizations to operate out of the Philippines.   
1. Abu Sayyaf Group 
The ASG, the smallest of the major Muslim militant groups in the Philippines, has 
the weakest ties to JI.  The ASG poses little threat and is considered to be a minor player 
in the problem of terrorism in the southern Philippines.  While the Philippines made great 
strides in putting down a well-known terrorist group in ASG, it is much smaller, more 
isolated, and does not have the international ties MILF has.  However, the Philippine 
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military believes ties between ASG and MILF endure as a result of inter-tribal bonds that 
demand they assist one another when necessary.61  For example, the two organizations 
cooperated in the execution of a series of bombings in Davao between March and April 
2003, as well as an ambush of Philippine Marines in July 2007 on the island of Basilan.62  
While the MILF officially condemned this particular act of violence, individual members 
sympathetic with both groups have a demonstrated track record of waging violence in the 
name of both. 
Originally founded in 1991, the ASG has taken arguably the most extreme 
separatist view regarding the future of Mindanao.  In addition to an independent Islamic 
state, the ASG also fights to wipe out all Christian influence there.63  They would like to 
undo the government policies of the 1950s, which inundated the Muslim population with 
Christians from the north.  Their leader, Abdurajak Janjalani, had also indicated the 
group’s intent to forcibly spread Islam outside of Mindanao.64  While their goals and 
ideals tend to line up with the Quran, the methods the ASG employ to achieve them 
contradict with the teachings of the book, which alienates the organization from 
mainstream Muslims in the southern Philippines.65  While the Moros seek to improve 
their standard of living, they generally do not subscribe to the ASG strategy. 
In the 1990s, the ASG’s violent tactics and outspoken agenda drew international 
attention, from governments and international terrorist organizations alike.  The 
previously mentioned Bojinka plot marked the apex of ASG’s power.  Following that, 
international government crackdowns quickly eliminated critical ASG leaders and no one 
since then has successfully rejuvenated the ASG.66  The Philippine military located and 
killed Janjalani following that, however.  His brother filled the leadership vacuum in 
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2000 and altered the course of ASG, focusing on fundraising via kidnappings.67  The 
group devolved quickly from planning complex international terrorist attacks to carrying 
out low-level, even if sometimes high profile, kidnapping for ransom acts for fundraising.  
However, this strategy produced unchecked results up until 9/11, building the strength of 
the ASG in terms of manpower and equipment. 
The Philippine government has struggled to eradicate ASG.  In 2001, the 
Philippine military allowed the ASG rebels they had surrounded to escape, probably as a 
result of a payoff from the ASG as a percentage of the ransom money they had received 
from someone they had kidnapped.68  ASG uses the profits from kidnappings to bribe 
corrupt military members and government officials.  While the ASG remains weakened, 
it has carried out a series of bombings throughout the Mindanao region, especially 
between 2004 and 2007.69  The ASG publicly considers these bombings successes 
attributed to the leadership of Janjalani’s brother.70  These bombings, however, failed to 
have the international implications of the Bojinka plot and no evidence indicates the 
group has the means to carry out a similar attack in the future.  In addition to bombings 
and kidnappings, ASG also continues to engage in extortion and murder, primarily for 
fundraising purposes.71  It appears today that the group acts more as an organized crime 
outfit than a fundamentalist group with a divine mission. 
Today, the government’s efforts have produced measurable results.  The ASG, 
once boasting membership up to 1500, currently has an estimated strength of 400, with 
only around 100 of those willing to carry out newsworthy violent attacks.72  These 
numbers remain fluid, often depending on the level of pressure placed on it by the 
Philippine military.  In addition, conflicting government policies with the ASG and the 
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MILF continue to wreak havoc on efforts to negotiate with the latter organization.  Some 
members continue to traverse both organizations, wearing the hat of the ASG one day 
and that of the MILF the next, resulting in confusion for Philippine military forces 
directed to eradicate ASG members while avoiding confrontation with MILF members.73  
In one clash between the Philippine military and ASG members in 2009 the military later 
learned they had killed 10 MILF members.74  Events such as this demonstrate the blurred 
lines between different Muslim separatist organizations in the southern Philippines. 
However, the extreme poverty and neglect of the ARMM by the Philippine government 
primes ASG to possibly regroup once the military pressure subsides.75  The government 
today employs almost exclusively a military strategy to diminish the ASG, a method 
which has produced success in the short term, but with an uncertain future. 
2. Moro-Islamic Liberation Front 
The MILF has fought for approximately 25 years to make the Mindanao region 
autonomous.  They demand local control of land and resources, and minimal national 
government intervention.76  They also advocate some form of reparations to account for 
past injustices.77  The Philippine government has provided autonomy to some areas of 
Mindanao and continues to work with the MILF and other groups to reach an agreement 
on autonomy and ultimately end repeated periods of violence.  By 2008, government 
negotiators, acting without real authority, promised the MILF everything they had 
demanded, raising hopes and expectations that, when put to the judicial test, would be 
dashed.78  In 2008, the Supreme Court abruptly rejected the agreement.79  Immediately 
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following the ruling, both sides acknowledged failure of the agreement and went back to 
resolution via violence.80  This had far-reaching implications, displacing nearly 400,000 
Mindanao residents.81  The court ruling only reinforced MILF’s long-held position that 
the government needs to take more extreme legislative action to reduce its role in the 
southern Philippines.82  The violence has once again ended as the parties reinitiated peace 
talks with Malay arbitration. 
Today, the MILF continues to aggressively pursue peace negotiations.  MILF 
spokesman Muhammed Ameen noted the importance of regional acceptance by its 
membership across Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.83  Local leaders in Mindanao 
have attempted to force disclosure and meet with government representatives but their 
efforts have largely been rebuffed.84  Additionally, some local leaders have complained 
that their constituents have no desire to be part of an autonomous region, Zamboanga 
City in particular.85  Not all government officials, however, trust the MILF.   
Negotiations between the MILF and the Philippine government continue to 
progress.  The MILF proposed to install a parliamentary system of government for 
Mindanao, but the government denied it, citing Constitutional violations with two 
separate systems of government in the country.86   The MILF also proposed increasing 
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the regional share of revenues to 75/25 in favor of the regional government.87  The 
largest point of contention from the MILF’s perspective remains the Memorandum of 
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MoA-AD) declared unconstitutional last summer.88  
The government has demonstrated a willingness to compromise as well.  The MILF cited 
a key element the government included in the peace proposal, enhanced autonomy that 
would allow the two sides to share government responsibilities, including collecting taxes 
and exploiting natural resources located in Mindanao.89  Although, the government noted 
that to enact all proposals put forth by the MILF would require a Constitutional 
amendment.90  Having said that, the government did not rule the possibility out and 
indicated they first want a clearer understanding of the MILF’s ultimate goals.91  In 
December 2009, both sides agreed on seven basic tenets that would underscore both 
proposals, including citizenship, government structure, property rights and other items 
considered fundamental to any MILF agreement.92  Any changes to the Constitution will 
likely take a significant amount of time and require buy in by the legislature.  The new 
administration under President Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino has publicly indicated a desire 
to continue the peace process with the MILF, but has yet to engage in discussion of 
resolution of any of the areas of disagreement.     
3. Other Islamic Extremists 
The Ramzi Yousef showcased to the global community that the Philippines has a 
problem with international terrorist organizations.  Since then, however, other evidence 
has emerged.  In particular, links between al Qaeda and a major separatist movement in 
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the southern Philippines, the MILF, as well as between MILF and the largest terrorist 
network in Southeast Asia, JI, have also been discovered since 9/11.       
Al Qaeda and JI for years have coordinated activity with the ASG and the MILF.  
In the 1990s, al Qaeda trained as many of 120,000 Muslims in camps to wage jihad 
across the globe, including in the Philippines.93  Since then, al Qaeda has evolved its 
method of operating from a centralized system designed to effect large, high-impact 
attacks to a decentralized system of more than twenty dispersed groups responsible for 
carrying out smaller, more easily executed local attacks.94  Efforts on the part of 
governments internationally since 9/11 have significantly weakened al Qaeda.  As a 
result, it is now attempting to regroup in regions of instability where it can recruit and 
train.  JI is representative of the altered strategy by al Qaeda, which provides critical 
funding and training to support attacks carried out by JI against Western targets.95   
The 9/11 Commission Report cites numerous historical examples of how the 
southern Philippines has been a hotbed of terrorist activity, linking attacks planned both 
regionally and in some instances, those that directly target the United States96.  Al Qaeda 
rekindled its ties with the ASG and MILF after 9/11 as part of its strategy to operate out 
of Southeast Asia to carry out further attacks against the United States.97  In 2002, 
Philippine military forces repeatedly uncovered Al Qaeda cells operating training camps 
in Mindanao.98  The MILF continues to operate a 5000 acre training camp in Mindanao 
that President Estrada tried and failed to overrun.99  Varying accounts of cooperation 
between Al Qaeda and MILF persist.  For example, in 2003 the Philippine government 
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successfully prevented execution of a coordinated attack targeting the U.S. Embassy in 
Manila and a number of other Western targets in the capital city when they arrested 
MILF leader Muklis Yunos, funded and supported by al Qaeda and JI.100 
Additionally, Philippine military forces arrested JI members operating training 
camps in Mindanao in 2003 and 2004.101  The JI/MILF connection endures and has 
increased.102  The rogue elements continue to cooperate with international terrorist 
organizations in spite of pleas by the MILF leadership to cease and desist.  It makes sense 
that international terrorist organizations look to the southern Philippines, given the 
professionally organized training program operated by the MILF throughout the region 
that loosely parallels what one would expect to find in any state run military.103  Based on 
this information, it is apparent that international terrorism has had a foothold in 
Mindanao, at least since the 1960s. 
JI represents possibly the greatest terrorist threat in Southeast Asia.  Originally 
formed in 1993, JI embraces a 1940s ideology to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state and 
borrowed organizational strategy from an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood.104  This ideology ultimately envisions a regional Islamic state integrating 
Indonesia, Malaysia, parts of Thailand, and the southern Philippines.105  This helps 
explain the close ties between JI, ASG and MILF.  At its peak just prior to 9/11, JI had an 
estimated 7,000 members, 2,000 of which were active participants in terrorist activity.  
Since 9/11, however, antiterrorism efforts on the part of the Indonesian government have 
resulted in the arrest or death of approximately 300 of its members.106  Unfortunately, it 
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took the bombings in Bali in October 2002, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 
200 people, for the Indonesian government to even recognize that JI existed.107  Analysis 
of JI’s mode of operations reveals that it prefers bombings like Bali as its main 
mechanism of waging jihad.108  JI remains a formidable regional presence in both 
Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Islamic militancy continued to fester in Mindanao in the 1990s and after 9/11, 
growing in size and aggressiveness.  JI elements are especially concerning given their 
direct ties to al-Qaeda, which considers them and the MILF to be its “operational wing in 
Southeast Asia”.109  JI regards the southern Philippines as a “safe haven” to train and 
operate from.110  Four of its key leaders reportedly remained in the southern Philippines 
in 2008, planning and coordinating future attacks with ASG and MILF elements.111  
Additionally, Philippine military forces uncovered Al Qaeda cells operating training 
camps in Mindanao repeatedly in 2002.112  As recently as 2007, the Philippine 
government has linked al Qaeda to a series of coordinated bombings carried out by ASG 
in General Santos City, Kidapawan and Cotabato.113  The larger problem the Philippine 
government faces today is that MILF faces a similar dilemma its predecessor, the MNLF, 
faced in 1984; various factions of the organization have begun breaking away and acting 
out on their own.   
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G. CONCLUSION 
 For centuries Muslims in the southern Philippines thrived in relative 
independence, largely free from colonial influence.  They farmed their lands, participated 
in the local political process, and preserved their culture.  It is no wonder then that the 
paradigm shift marked by the onset of a new colonial power that sought to assimilate 
them into a foreign culture deemed superior to their own that they fought against it.  The 
native people of the southern Philippines voiced their preferences consistently in the early 
20th century.  In spite of the U.S. colonial power opting for assimilation instead of 
separation, the Muslims continued efforts to build bridges.  In return, Muslims asked to 
maintain the standard of living they had grown so familiar with over the course of more 
than 300 years, land to farm, participation in the local political process and cultural 
preservation.  The relationship between Muslims and their colonizer remained 
precariously peaceful in the early 20th century. 
However, following the conclusion of World War II, conditions for Philippine 
Muslims changed.  At a time when conventional wisdom concluded they would enjoy 
unprecedented freedoms and opportunities, the new Catholic-dominated government in 
Manila had other ideas.  In efforts to unite the country, the nascent Philippine government 
had two paths it could go down.  First, it could allow the Muslims access to the national 
political body, providing them a forum in which they could voice grievances and a 
process through which the national government could address them.  Second, it could 
adopt a Catholic-centric unitary government seeking to assimilate the many cultures of 
the 7,000 plus islands into a single culture.  The government chose the latter path, 
attempting to covert a society that had no desire to convert and, when that failed, to 
marginalize the society through the systematic dilution of the representative population.  
In the span of a couple of decades, the southern Philippines went from a 90 percent 
Muslim population to a 20 percent Muslim population following government incentives 
provided to Catholics.  The government gave Catholics land the Muslims believed 
belonged to them and access to resources unavailable to Muslims, enabling the new 
migrants to the south opportunities for unprecedented wealth at the expense of the native 
population.   
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For decades Muslims endured these injustices, occasionally protesting and 
rebelling but, divided amongst themselves, not realizing any material gains with these 
actions.  However, the Jabidah massacre in 1968 marked a turning point for Muslims, 
uniting them against a common enemy, the national government.  While the event that 
sparked revolt occurred more than four decades ago, Muslims remain united in efforts to 
separate from the country.  Considering the fact that Muslims tried all other alternatives 
to assimilate politically while preserving religious and cultural identity, it is not 
surprising that they believe separation is the only option left available to them.  While it 
may not be too late for the national government to convince Muslims the political climate 
has changed, such that they can successfully participate in the political process and voice 
their grievances, this will take significant persuasion, and action, on the part of the 
national government.  The bridges Muslims tried to build starting a century ago have long 
been taken out.  It is up to the national government to try and rebuild them. 
 32
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 33
III. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES DEFINED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. generally treated terrorism as a criminal act to be punished 
within the U.S. legal system.  The United States’ response to terrorist attacks previously 
against the World Trade Center, the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City 
and the attack of the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen typified how America dealt with 
terrorist attacks in the 1990s.  In each case, the United States engaged local law 
enforcement and the FBI, conducted trials and worked with other countries to identify 
and capture the criminals involved in the attacks.   
At the same time, the United States engaged in a gradual dismantling of its 
military and defense forces.  The lack of a superpower threat resulted in the closure of 
dozens of bases at home and abroad, and the reduction in the size of the U.S. military 
force.  In the early 1990s, the United States closed its naval base in Subic Bay and Clark 
Air Force Base, withdrawing thousands of U.S. military forces stationed in the 
Philippines since the conclusion of World War II.  The end of the Cold War reduced the 
need for continued military buildup in Southeast Asia, resulting in elimination of the 
“American-led security network in Asia.”114  While the United States continued to 
engage in military and diplomatic activities with the Philippines, these focused primarily 
on countering the influence of China in the region, not counterterrorism. 
However, following the 9/11 attacks the United States adopted an aggressive 
approach to combating terrorism and defeating al Qaeda as part of a new overall U.S 
counterterrorism strategy.  Since al Qaeda was globally dispersed, the United States could 
not focus on it in the same manner as it would a conventional military force.  Instead, 
America chose to focus on known areas where al Qaeda and its affiliates were 
concentrated.  The United States transitioned from treating terrorist attacks as criminal 
acts to considering them as acts of war.   
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After 9/11, the United States first implemented this new strategy with evolved 
U.S. military policies, which commenced operations in Afghanistan and later Iraq.  It 
then froze financial assets of known or suspected terrorists and supporters.  The United 
States then engaged in training programs in the Philippines, and implemented many other 
strategies designed to prevent terrorist attacks from taking place on the U.S. homeland.  
In other words, U.S. military strategy evolved from a reactive approach to a proactive 
approach.  The 9/11 Commission Report, released in 2003, postulated that Southeast Asia 
would be the “second front” in the war on terrorism.  The United States believed pursuing 
radical Islam in Southeast Asia would put it a step ahead of the terrorists, given the fact 
that Indonesia contains the largest Muslim population in the world and Islam remains 
active throughout the region, largely in some of the poorest parts of the region. 
U.S. nonmilitary policies involved both the use of internal organizations such as 
USAID, as well as cooperation with international organizations.  The U.S. signed an 
agreement with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for regional 
cooperation in a 2002 ASEAN-U.S. Joint Declaration to Combat Terrorism, formalizing 
military relationships with all countries in the region.115  President Bush altered the 
strategy in Southeast Asia from trying to check a rising China to focusing on 
counterterrorism efforts, especially in the Philippines.  Shortly after 9/11, the U.S. and 
Philippine governments increased cooperation efforts with one another, primarily aimed 
at targeting the ASG, thought to have the closest ties to al Qaeda and JI.  The United 
States sought and received support from the Philippines for its position to offensively go 
after al Qaeda affiliates there.  It is apparent that both states have gone to great lengths to 
address terrorism in the Philippines.  
B. CT POLICIES FOR THE PHILIPPINES 
As a result of terrorist activity in the Philippines directly affecting U.S. homeland 
security, the United States has implemented a two-step approach to combat terrorism 
there.  First, the United States significantly increased cooperation efforts with the 
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Philippine military.  The American military worked with the Philippine military, training 
Filipino soldiers to maintain law and order.  The military component wields the stick part 
of a typical “carrot and stick” strategy in terms of waging violence against insurgents, but 
it also utilizes U.S. military forces to improve domestic law and order capabilities.  
Second, U.S. counterterrorism assistance to the Philippines involves nonmilitary 
components.  The United States intends the nonmilitary components to address the 
underlying causes of grievances by Philippine Muslims.  They are largely humanitarian 
approaches designed to fight poverty and increase educational opportunities for the 
Muslim population. 
In May 2010, President Obama’s administration released a new National Security 
Strategy that outlined his intent for the country’s long-term objectives.  The new strategy 
reinforces the United States’ commitment to Southeast Asia and the Philippines, but 
alters some elements and includes additional ones not mentioned in the 2006 National 
Security Strategy.  The following statement best highlights the old and new regarding 
America’s commitment to Southeast Asia, “We are working together with our allies to 
develop a positive security agenda for the region, focused on regional security, combating 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, climate change, international 
piracy, epidemics, and cybersecurity, while achieving balanced growth and human 
rights.”116  The 2010 strategy includes human rights and climate change while 
deemphasizing the importance of spreading democracy, as the 2006 strategy did, stating 
its intentions as follows, “Forging new international initiatives and institutions can assist 
in the spread of freedom, prosperity, and regional security.”117  President Obama’s 
administration has tailored its policies and expenditures to meet the intent of the new 
strategy, as will be discussed shortly. 
In addition to actions on the part of the United States, other countries with vested 
interests in peace for the Philippines engaged to stabilize the south.  As one of the 
Philippines’ largest trading partners, Japan has a vested interest in engaging with a 
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stabilized country, and it has invested enormous amounts of money to aid the Philippines.  
Japan’s Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao earmarked more than $400 
million between 2005 and 2010 to develop the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao 
(ARMM).118  That money has benefitted more than 200,000 residents of the ARMM, 
built four elementary schools and twelve medical clinics, as well as funded a number of 
other initiatives designed to improve conditions in the ARMM.119  In total, Japan has sent 
almost $3 billion in aid to Mindanao in efforts to combat poverty and stabilize the 
island.120  As an incentive for the peace talks between the Philippine government and the 
MILF, Japan has more recently provided close to 400 million Philippine pesos (~$8 
million) to construct a training center and establish a high school computer literacy 
program.121  Given Japan’s limited military capacity, it makes sense that the aid it has 
provided has been humanitarian in scope.   
Additionally, Australia has provided large amounts of money to combat poverty 
and stabilize the southern Philippines.  It has attempted to tie humanitarian aid to 
outcomes and peaceful resolution as an incentive to both sides in the separatist dispute.  
Following the 1996 peace agreements with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), 
Australia provided approximately $1.5 million to rebuild areas affected by the conflict.122  
They have been the largest donor to United Nations programs benefitting the Philippines, 
providing 1.3 billion pesos (~$30 million) there, as well as more than 4 billion pesos 
(~$80 million) between 2008 and 2009 to help educate and stabilize the ARMM.123  Part 
of this also included $161,000 to construct a counterterrorism center for local police 
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officials.124  In fact, the Philippines have relied on a number of its regional neighbors to 
support it as it struggles to restore peace to the south.  For years now, Malaysia has acted 
as the main mediator facilitating the peace talks between the MILF and the government.   
It is important to note other international efforts to combat terrorism in the 
Philippines.  The United States has close allies pursuing the same ends it pursues, though 
they have approached it with a very different strategy.  Comparing and contrasting the 
different strategies presents an opportunity to develop a comprehensive, multi-national 
strategy to the benefit of all concerned.  While it would appear on the surface that the aid 
provided by Australia, Japan, and the United States (which will be detailed next) 
complement each other, in reality the countries have not worked together on these 
projects.  Each country has different incentives motivating them, and use different 
approaches to achieve their ends. 
1. Military Strategy 
The U.S. military plays a supporting role to the Philippine military in Mindanao 
and the rest of the south under the JSOTF-P.  As a result of strict rules of engagement, 
U.S. forces cannot engage in offensive combat actions in the country.  Instead, their role, 
according to Garry Reid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Combating Terrorism, is as follows, “The mission of JSOTF-P is to support the … 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their fight against terrorism in the southern 
Philippines.”125  In this supporting role, the JSOTF-P provides advice and resources to 
the AFP.  The Philippines adopted the National Internal Security Plan (NISP) in 2002.  
The plan incorporates diplomatic, informational, psychological and security operations 
with the goal of eliminating insurgencies by both Muslim separatists and communists.  
The NISP seeks to achieve this objective in a series of steps, aided by the United States 
and others.  These steps are:  (1) defeat armed insurgent organizations, (2) dismantle their 
infrastructures, (3) defend and protect the local population, (4) establish government 
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control in insurgent controlled areas, (5) address the root causes of insurgency, (6) 
marginalize insurgents and isolate them from the population, and (7) persuade the 
population to ally with the government.126  The objectives in the NISP closely resemble 
U.S. nation building strategy.  The United States has implemented this strategy with 
varying levels of success in the past fifty years.  When the United States has fully 
embraced the nation building strategy in a truly integrated fashion, it has found success.  
As an example, the surge in Iraq in 2007 reversed the insurgent trend when the United 
States embedded military training teams in districts and villages, demonstrating to the 
local population their intentions to remain long-term, secure the population and drive and 
keep out insurgents.  After a few months, this strategy eventually turned many insurgents 
to the side of the coalition and populations ultimately rebelled against the insurgents.  
However, when the strategy has fractured or become compartmentalized, it generally has 
failed.  For example, in Iraq shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the United 
States attempted to rebuild infrastructure, only to find insurgents sabotaging equipment 
and construction projects.  The insurgents would then melt back into society.   
In 2002, President Bush ordered U.S. military forces into the Philippines in an 
effort to combat terrorism offshore.  Standing up JSOTF-P, the United States deployed 
150 Special Forces to accompany Filipino military patrols in the southern Philippines, as 
well as 500 conventional forces to support the operations.127  Soon after, the United 
States increased this footprint to more than 2,000.128  U.S. military forces supported a 
4,000 strong contingent of Filipino soldiers sent to counter the insurgents.129  The AFP 
would eventually expand their force to 7,000.  JSOTF-P has trained Filipino military 
forces in activities, such as “operations intelligence fusion, unit interoperability, logistics, 
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and aspects of engineering, equipment, and maintenance.”130  The Philippine military 
took this training and applied it offensively against the ASG.  By 2006, the military 
issued ultimatums to ASG members to put down arms or face military action.  The 
“Oplan Ultimatum” identified 500 ASG members and by March 2007 resulted in the 
death of 79 and capture of 28.131  This marked the first long-term U.S. military presence 
in the Philippines, since withdrawal of forces in the early 1990s, and since the passage of 
a Philippine Constitutional mandate outlawing a permanent foreign military presence in 
the country.  While there are no signs of the United States removing its military forces 
from the Philippines any time soon, their role as a supporting, noncombat force to the 
AFP makes their presence more palatable to Filipinos wary of a repeat of decades of 
imperialism. 
In addition to reestablishing a military footprint in the Philippines, the United 
States provided materiel support to the Philippine military.  U.S. military forces deployed 
to the Philippines with logistics support, intended for Philippine military forces to 
increase their effectiveness.132  For example, the Philippines accepted 16 UH-1 Huey 
military aircraft to expand their operational capabilities through U.S. military assistance 
programs.133  These initiatives marked the beginning of an effort by the United States to 
modernize the Philippine military, intended to expand its capacity to oppose the 
insurgency on its own. 
As the United States gradually improved the equipment used by the Philippine 
military, it also slowly spread the scope of the U.S. military mission there.  In 2004, the 
United States expanded military operations and trained Filipino troops to fight against 
terrorist elements in the south.134  The United States also received strategic port rights 
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from the Philippines around the same time.135  When the United States restored the ties 
broken with the Philippines in the early 1990s, it made it easier for the U.S. military to 
operate unimpeded, as well as to channel support and funding to the Philippine military.  
The Philippine military increased its forces in the southern Philippines to 7,000 in 2005 
and worked with U.S. support to carry out continued offensives against the ASG.136  
JSOTF-P continued to provide training, logistics support, and aerial intelligence 
reconnaissance in efforts to support Philippine led offensives designed to locate, identify 
and weaken the ASG.137  Years of military action and hundreds of millions of dollars 
have had the desired effect of weakening the ASG.   
In addition to the military expenditures the United States provided in the 
Philippines, it injected direct military aid funds.  The Philippines received the largest 
amount of U.S. military assistance in the region, which grew from $30 million to $55 
million between 2005 and 2006, nearly doubling the amount of money, in terms of 
military aid, the United States provided to the Philippines in a one-year time span.138 
Initiatives such as the Philippine Defense Reform Program and the Capability Upgrade 
Program provided additional training and equipment to the Philippine military.  For 
example, under these programs in 2006, the U.S. Navy agreed to provide $49 million to 
help fund the Philippines Coast Watch South project, including acquisition of Cyclone 
class patrol boats the Philippine military would use to secure the waters of the southern 
Philippines.139  The U.S. military footprint in the southern Philippines has continued up to 
the present day.   
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By 2007, the U.S. military had cemented relations with the Philippine military as 
well as the local population in the south.  Programs like those already mentioned acted as 
a springboard from which the U.S. military launched humanitarian endeavors in 
Mindanao.140  The annual Balikatan exercise incorporated humanitarian efforts alongside 
the offensive military operations, gradually warming locals to the long-term presence of 
the U.S. military.141  The JSOTF-P also engaged directly in humanitarian projects.  They 
built roads, piers, schools, and markets while also providing medical assistance.142  The 
Philippine government believed the combination of the strong arm of the military to 
suppress opposition and the humanitarian arm to aid locals would eventually win over the 
population and erode support for the Islamic extremist factions.   
By 2009, the U.S. military footprint in the Philippines had expanded considerably.  
Headquartered in Zamboanga, JSOTF-P has forward operating bases throughout 
Mindanao, Sulu and Jolo.143  Although the total U.S. military force has reduced in size, 
600 military personnel still remain in the region.144  In spite of the increased attention the 
United States has given the Philippines, it has come with a number of strings attached.   
Nearly ten years in, JSOTF-P acknowledges it has had challenges and shortcomings.  
U.S. Army Colonel William Coultroup, JSOTF-P Commander until July 2010, highlights 
his concerns with the ASG, stating that, “even though they’ve been reduced, until you 
can neutralize them and prevent these safe havens, the concern is that they will regenerate 
later on.” 145  Additionally, in spite of the many humanitarian projects, targeted to areas 
infested with insurgents in efforts to win over the local population, recruiting efforts by 
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the insurgents remain successful.146  The U.S. military has taken similar approaches in 
nation-building strategies in other parts of the world successfully, suggesting that perhaps 
some elements of nation-building may be missing or incomplete with the JSOTF-P 
strategy.  It also raises questions as to the effectiveness of the strategy outlined in the 
NISP, in particular whether or not the AFP, with U.S. support, has successfully 
marginalized and isolated insurgents from the local population, in light of Col 
Coultroup’s comments. 
2. Nonmilitary Strategy 
While the United States tends to deploy military forces as a tool of first resort, it 
has also relied on the State Department and USAID, especially in support of 
humanitarian aid for the Philippines.  However, State Department resources pale in 
comparison to the Department of Defense (DoD).  In terms of personnel alone, the DoD 
currently employs 1.7 million men and women in the armed forces, while USAID only 
employs 2,000.147  While the departments each carry out very different mission sets, the 
geographic area they cover is the same, USAID often provides nonmilitary aid in many 
regions the DoD has no footprint in.  USAID also has the ability to go into a country with 
resources on behalf of the United States without the stigma of imperialism or occupation 
that many identify with military forces.  As a result, they USAID often completes 
humanitarian projects like the JSOTF-P has been doing, but without fear of alienating 
locals or risk of insurgent attacks.  The United States agreed to supply $190 million in 
nonmilitary aid over five years to support the Philippine government’s “hearts and 
minds” approach to negotiating with the MILF and convincing the ARMM population the 
government supported them.148  U.S. foreign aid to the Philippines increased 
substantially, with total foreign aid doubling between 2001 and 2002.  This approach has 
provided aid and funding for construction projects in the southern Philippines in an 
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attempt to increase the standard of living and provide jobs.  The U.S. intended this aid to 
lure MILF members out of the organization and into stable jobs within larger Mindanao 
society.149  Additionally, U.S. leaders have emphasized the importance of humanitarian 
projects in local communities to forge relationships and rebuild trust with the local 
people.150  These programs are intended to win the support of the population and wean 
them off of support provided by terrorist groups. The United States has remained 
committed to the Philippines, as these numbers have remained at peak levels since then. 
The method of funding by the State Department since 9/11 has changed, largely 
as a result of it getting more familiar with local conditions on the ground and how to 
interact with the Philippine government.  The United States emphasized spending in the 
southern Philippines in particular, earmarking as much as 70 percent of all State 
Department aid to the country for that region.151  Total State Department spending in the 
Philippines between 2001 and 2002 went from $49 million to $95 million.152  The initial 
increase went in large part toward preventing the Philippine military from deteriorating; 
the report does not mention Department of Defense efforts to achieve the same goal.153 
Spending increased over the course of the next three years.  In 2004, the State 
Department spent more than $130 million in the Philippines.154  However, nonmilitary 
expenditures for programs such as building new schools, supplying computers to schools 
or improving electric grids, decreased significantly from 2002 levels, which peaked at 
more than $50 million.  By 2004, this funding program had reduced to $20 million.155  
For example, they provided Economic and Support Funds to assist in compelling local 
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separatists to put down arms and return to farming.156  However, the State Department 
does not distinguish between separatists fighting for the MNLF, MILF or ASG.  This 
contrasts with the Defense Department’s focus on eliminating ASG, cooperating with 
MILF on a peace agreement and aiding in the integration of the MNLF into mainstream 
society. 
State Department spending in support of the Philippines peaked in 2005.  By then, 
they committed $135 million, representing an increased expenditure almost three times 
that of pre-9/11 levels.  Since then, however, the State Department has gradually reduced 
aid to the Philippines.  In 2007, the State Department committed more than $90 million in 
aid to the Philippines.157  The State Department has consistently focused Philippine aid 
efforts in large part on Mindanao with goals designed to “support conflict resolution in 
Mindanao, fight corruption and improve governance….”158  To this end, aid directed 
toward improving the quality of life for people living in the southern Philippines 
increased once again, to more than $40 million that year.159  They also spent 
approximately $38 million as part of its long term plan to rebuild the Philippine 
military.160  Once again, the report does not mention any coordination with the 
Department of Defense on the nature of this program. 
The State Department once again ramped up spending in the Philippines in 2008.  
Expenditures for that year totaled almost $125 million.161  It continued to spend 
significant amounts of money training Philippine police forces to maintain law and order 
in Mindanao.  However, the State Department began pulling away from direct support of 
the Philippine military, marking a transition to full military support from the Department 
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of Defense instead.162  USAID continued to expend its nearly $30 million budget to 
improve living conditions in Mindanao.163  State Department expenditures continued 
with this strategy of increased emphasis on humanitarian projects and combating poverty 
in Mindanao until the latest budget request. 
The current budget request for the State Department represents significant shifts 
in strategy in its approach to the Philippines.  While it is slightly down from the 2010 
peak expenditure of just over $140 million, the request remains high at $132 million.164  
However, the 2011 budget request eliminates almost all funding in support of the 
Philippine military, noting that the Department of Defense will continue to support the 
Philippine military.165  Additionally, it significantly increases expenditures on 
development assistance with a renewed focus on the country at large.  These programs 
appear to shift away from a focus on education and improved infrastructure in Mindanao 
toward national green energy initiatives, environmentally friendly infrastructure 
improvements and human trafficking.166  If approved, the 2011 budget will mark a 
significant departure from the ten-year-old strategy of the post-9/11 State Department.  
None of the three identified areas in the 2011 budget request have been given this level of 
priority in the past.  However, it clearly maintains course with the new 2010 National 
Security Strategy described earlier.  Interestingly, throughout analysis of the State 
Department budgets, end of year outlays significantly surpassed initial budget requests, 
sometimes by as much as 50 percent.  This is likely a result of conservative baseline 
budget requests followed up with an injection of funds as Congress each year approved 
one-time Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) funds.  It remains to be seen whether or not 
aid to the Philippines will continue to receive these additional fund injections in the 
future. 
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In total, the State Department has invested more than $1 billion in the Philippines, 
most of which it has directed toward the conflict areas in the south.  While this seems like 
a significant amount of money, it is one-third the amount Japan has sent.  Given the 
priority the National Security Strategy has identified for Southeast Asia as the “second 
front,” it seems the State Department would expend more resources there.  In fairness 
though, the Philippines has received the largest portion of State Department expenditures 
in Southeast Asia.  The larger issue may be that the federal government has not 
sufficiently funded the State Department to meet its charter.  However, State Department 
fiscal year requests for the Philippines have consistently been fully funded and in some 
cases funded further through contingency dollars.  In light of this, perhaps the State 
Department could take a more ambition approach on its end to achieving its objectives in 
the Philippines. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the Philippines has relied on a two-pronged 
approach of military and nonmilitary initiatives.  In 2006, the State Department began 
coordinating through USAID with JSOTF-P on some humanitarian efforts intended to 
improve water supply, sanitation road infrastructure and fishing.167  Improved 
coordination has ensured USAID funds have been spent in areas secure from insurgents.  
The United States designed these policies to work together to minimize the incentives the 
ASG and MILF use to recruit moderate Muslims into their ranks, mainly poverty and 
lack of education.  For more than eight years, U.S. policies have been in effect with the 
same end-state in mind.  The tactics and strategies undertaken initially have remained 
relatively constant and changed little during this period.   
The United States has worked with the Philippine government to execute its 
strategies but has not really coordinated efforts with Japan, Australia and Malaysia.  All 
players desire the same thing but use different approaches to achieve it.  None of these 
other countries have military forces or capabilities that could replace that of the United 
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States, but they have aggressively pursued humanitarian efforts that the United States 
could take into consideration with both its military and nonmilitary strategies. In fact, 
detailing the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism in the Philippines raises a number of 
questions and concerns.  Has the United States taken the most effective approach to the 
situation in the Philippines?  Why have U.S. efforts not accounted for the efforts of their 
neighboring allies, such as Japan and Australia?  Would a more inclusive approach help 
defray costs to the United States and at the same time strengthen the position of all 
countries involved?  Will the new course outlined in the 2010 National Security Strategy 
remedy perceived shortcomings?  The United States undoubtedly remains committed to 
its eight-year old mission of stabilizing the southern Philippines, but analysis of the 
strategy to date, as well as the new turn imminent with the 2010 National Security 
Strategy and backed by the 2011 budget request, has the potential to offer an alternative 
approach to the situation.  American military forces and USAID workers perform 
admirably, the nation’s leaders owe it to them to provide a well-thought out blueprint for 
success with achievable objectives with an end-state in mind. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since 9/11, the United States has sustained a substantial military presence in the 
Philippines and provided a wide range of economic assistance.  But, have these efforts 
made the U.S. homeland more secure?  Have U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad 
enhanced homeland security?   
Islamic militant groups in the southern Philippines have been a problem for 
decades.  These groups have evolved over the years, escalating and de-escalating 
violence as the government changed its attitude toward the different organizations.  Even 
with the government agreeing to establish the ARMM, Islamic militancy continued to 
fester in Mindanao, growing in size, diversity and aggressiveness.  Through a coordinated 
effort, U.S. and Philippine military forces have marginalized some elements of Islamic 
militancy.  It appears, though, that U.S. policies to date have been piecemeal, 
uncoordinated, and failed to address the root causes that attract terrorists there.  As a 
result, the ASG remains alive, peace with the MILF elusive, and JI continues to evolve.  
In order to achieve success in the future, it is crucial that the United States adopt a 
comprehensive strategy to address the root causes that have turned the Philippines into a 
safe haven for terrorist operations. 
B. POLICY SUCCESSES 
To properly assess whether U.S. counterterrorism policies in the Philippines have 
been successful, it is necessary to define what criteria those policies should meet in order 
to achieve success.  First, U.S. policies should have an impact on the most prominent and 
most dangerous terrorist organizations in the Philippines.  Successful U.S. policy would 
noticeably reduce the ability of those organizations to train and operate.  Additionally, 
they would have to limit their operations, as well as their cooperation with international 
terrorist organizations, such as JI and al Qaeda.  Finally, the policies should have such an 
effect that the public perceives they have achieved their stated goals. 
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Today, U.S. and Philippine military forces have largely contained the ASG, and it 
no longer poses a substantial threat to U.S. homeland security, a notable success for both 
militaries.  The ASG, once boasting membership up to 1500, currently has an estimated 
strength of 400, with only around 100 of those willing to carry out newsworthy violent 
attacks.168  Eight years of U.S. promoted military offensives have paid off regarding 
efforts to marginalize the ASG.  The Department of Defense believes its approach 
focusing on the ASG has found success, arguing it has brought “security to previously 
contested areas.”169  The United States to date can consider this a tactical victory. 
The Philippine government has requested the United States not designate the 
MILF as a terrorist organization, or confront it in the same manner they have the ASG for 
fear that doing so would undermine the ongoing peace process between the MILF and 
Philippine government.  The Philippine Army prefers a softer “hearts and minds” 
approach in Mindanao, which RAND argues has decreased violence.170  This approach 
appears to have worked at the strategic level regarding relations with the MILF.  In 
December 2009, both sides agreed on seven basic tenets that would underscore both 
proposals for a long-term peace agreement, including citizenship, government structure, 
property rights and other items considered fundamental to any MILF agreement.171  In 
order to promote the peace process, the Philippine government has funded an information 
campaign designed to publicize the progress and gain support from the general 
population of Mindanao.172  Recognition of the MILF and efforts to work with it for a 
peace agreement have acted as a deterrent, at least for the group at large, against 
harboring al Qaeda affiliates.173  At the local level, however, the military and MILF 
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leadership struggle to contain rogue elements.  However, the MILF distances itself from 
attacks carried out by the rogue elements, publicly condemning them.  It remains to be 
seen if the U.S. policy of restraint regarding the MILF will pay off. 
U.S. policy has also encouraged regional cooperation by the Philippines with its 
ASEAN partners, which has produced notable results in reducing terrorist attacks.  A 
2008 report contends that the cooperative efforts by the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Singapore eliminated terrorist-related bombings for a three-year period in Manila, largely 
as a result of those governments freezing assets, which prevented the funding of terrorist 
operations.174  The United States has demonstrated willingness in the past to take an 
inclusive approach with allies to solving the problem of terrorism in the Philippines.  
However, this appears to represent the exception, and not the rule in terms of U.S. 
counterterrorist policy there. 
C. POLICY CHALLENGES 
Even with the Philippine government agreeing to establish the ARMM, Islamic 
militancy continued to fester in Mindanao, growing in size, diversity and aggressiveness, 
even as conditions on the ground have evolved.  The 9/11 Commission Report cites 
numerous historical examples of how the southern Philippines has been a hotbed of 
terrorist activity, linking attacks planned both regionally and in some instances, those that 
directly target the United States175.  Following the resignation of President Joseph 
Estrada in 2001, the government began negotiations with the MILF, which led to 
sporadic ceasefires and commencement of hostilities.  The Philippine government 
continues to negotiate with the MILF, but has problems constraining some of the more 
radical elements of its organization from aiding al Qaeda affiliates.176  This appears to be 
an indication that appeasing one group will not necessarily translate to satisfying the 
larger movement. The Philippines lived through this history when it signed the agreement 
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to establish the ARMM with the MNLF.  When the MNLF laid down arms, dissatisfied 
elements, primarily in ASG and MILF, rose up and waged even greater violence than the 
MNLF had.  Addressing the grievances of the population at large may make more sense.  
Actions taken by the Philippine government appear to have been misguided and, in any 
event, have failed to stabilize the southern Philippines and stay terrorism there.   
Additionally, the threat of terrorism in the Philippines has witnessed increased 
diversity as international terrorist groups discovered they could plan and operate out of 
the lawless pockets of the south.  JI elements are especially concerning given their direct 
ties to al Qaeda, which considers them and the MILF to be its “operational wing in 
Southeast Asia”.177  JI regards the southern Philippines as a “safe haven” to train and 
operate from.178  Philippine military forces continued to uncover al Qaeda cells operating 
training camps with the MILF in Mindanao repeatedly, as recently as 2002.179  Philippine 
military forces arrested JI members operating training camps in Mindanao in 2003 and 
2004.180  In 2009, Niksch indicated the JI/MILF connection endured and has 
increased.181  It makes sense that international terrorist organizations look to the southern 
Philippines, given the professionally organized training program operated by the MILF 
throughout the region that loosely parallels what one would expect to find in any state run  
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military.182  International terrorism has apparently had a foothold in Mindanao, at least 
since the 1960s.  During this time, the MILF in particular has built significant 
infrastructure to develop and train its recruits. 
The southern Philippines remain an area outside the span of control of the 
government, and organizations there continue to threaten stability in the Philippines.  For 
example, in the run up to the May 2010 elections, a local militia massacred 32 journalists 
in Maguindanao in November 2009.   The government has arrested scores of suspects, 
but the family in charge of the militia retains control over large sections of the province, 
including local law enforcement and judges.  Throughout the southern Philippines the 
government relies on locally run dynastic militias to maintain law and order, and to keep 
MILF in check.  When elements of the militias go rogue, which happens often, the 
government has no effective means of response.  These militias flourished under 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.  President Aquino has vowed to eliminate them but 
has yet to detail a plan to achieve that goal.  Eradicating these militias will be difficult 
considering they profited greatly under President Arroyo and built up formidable forces 
with excellent equipment and training. 
Basic American involvement in solving this dilemma has challenges.  Mindanao’s 
Muslims have not forgotten early American acts of violence in attempts to assimilate 
them.183  The increased U.S. military presence has remained contentious today due to the 
colonial history.184  Muslim militants remember the U.S. denied them independence in 
1946.185  Additionally, the Iraqi invasion in 2003 alienated large segments of the Muslim  
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population in Southeast Asia, ultimately limiting government cooperation.186  This 
American animosity persists today in the southern Philippines in spite of the 
comparatively small U.S. military footprint there.   
Varying accounts of cooperation between Al Qaeda and the MILF persist, 
encouraged by corrupt local government officials, highlighting nonmilitary struggles by 
the Philippine government.  Government corruption in the Philippines has enabled 
factions of the MILF to coordinate training and operations with JI.187  The Philippine 
government decided not to take action against rogue elements of MILF that allowed JI to 
operate and train in Mindanao.188  This is especially worrying considering that the 
government has the opportunity to use any affiliation with JI as leverage in the peace 
process.  JI’s presence in the Philippines matters because it has worked in the past with al 
Qaeda on numerous terrorist attacks.  These facts set the stage for continued cooperation 
on training and planning operations conducted from the southern Philippines by these 
terrorist organizations as long as the corruption remains.  External persistence further 
reinforces the argument that the government needs to address the grievances of a 
population, not a group. 
Another notable nonmilitary struggle has been the inability of the government of 
the Philippines to negotiate peace in the more than 25 year existence of the MILF.  In 
2008, government negotiators, acting without real authority, promised the MILF 
everything they had demanded, raising hopes and expectations that, when put to the 
judicial test, would be dashed.189  In 2008, the Supreme Court abruptly rejected the 
agreement.190  Immediately following the ruling, both sides acknowledged failure of the 
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agreement and went back to resolution via violence.191  This had far-reaching 
implications, displacing nearly 400,000 Mindanao residents.192  The court ruling only 
reinforced the MILF’s long-held position that the government needs to take more extreme 
legislative action to reduce its role in the southern Philippines.193  Since then, though, 
things have stabilized, with Malaysian arbitration and talks underway, and a ceasefire 
currently in place.  However, further compounding these problems, some local leaders 
have complained that their constituents have no desire to be part of an autonomous 
region, Zamboanga City in particular.194  While the government cannot realistically 
expect unanimous support, the more universal it is, the more likely they can sustain 
peace.  This will likely involve negotiations beyond just the MILF. 
D. HAS IT WORKED? 
Considering the U.S. strategy to combat terrorism in the Philippines, it seems to 
have had some successes.  The two militaries have marginalized the threat posed by the 
ASG and it conducts mainly fringe operations on isolated islands today.  Additionally, it 
appears that Philippine government negotiations with the MILF, supported by the United 
States as the preferred strategy in dealing with this particular separatist organization, have 
deterred it from welcoming al Qaeda and JI in recent years.  While it is important to 
applaud these successes, it appears they are symptoms of a much larger problem; much 
remains to be done.   
The very fact that the United States has military forces in the Philippines 
compounds the problems there.  To begin with, the increased U.S. military presence 
remained contentious due to the colonial history; the United States violently put down 
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numerous rebellions by acclaimed Philippine revolutionary Emilio Aguinaldo.195  
Filipinos today still hold Aguinaldo in high regard for his efforts at the turn of the 20th 
century to gain independence from American and Spanish colonial powers.  International 
terrorist organizations often exploit situations like that in the southern Philippines in 
hopes of wearing down the United States and breaking public will.196  Al Qaeda and JI 
have demonstrated a commitment to this strategy in the southern Philippines.   
Much of the U.S. military effort to date has centered on suppressing activity by 
the ASG, the smallest of the major Muslim militant groups in the Philippines, which has 
rarely targeted American interests, and has the weakest ties to JI.  While the United States 
has made great strides in putting down a well-known terrorist group in ASG, it is much 
smaller, more isolated, and does not have the international ties the MILF has.  The United 
States, at the request of the Philippines, has avoided confrontation with the MILF as 
much as possible and not placed them on its list of terrorist organizations, in spite of the 
many connections the MILF has displayed with other international terrorist organizations.  
As a result, many terrorists in the southern Philippines have retained most of their 
capabilities.  While avoiding confrontation may be politically expedient, the U.S. military 
footprint has only scratched the surface of combating terrorism in the Philippines. The 
MILF has distanced itself from rogue elements, as well as connections to JI and al Qaeda, 
but the links continue to persist.  Additionally, when the MILF have reacted negatively to 
the peace talks, the results for the people have been devastating, making one question 
how much “buy-in” the MILF really has with the local population. 
Additionally, the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P) 
has had its hands tied in terms of its ability to operate.  Rules of engagement only 
allowing them to train Philippine forces to combat terrorism, combined with the 
restriction of operations against MILF, have put JSOTF-P in a precarious situation, 
especially when hostilities might break out locally and they cannot determine whether or 
not the opposition comprises of ASG or MILF forces.  JSOTF-P forces perform 
                                                 
195 Eni H. Faleomavaega, “Japan’s Changing Role,” Political Transcript From House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, Washington, DC, June 
29, 2009. 
196 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, Oxford University Press, 2009, 109. 
 57
admirably; doing whatever job they are tasked to do.  Unfortunately, the Vietnam-like 
rules of engagement unnecessarily put U.S. forces at risk with no real definition of 
mission completion.     
Analysis of U.S. strategies reveals three shortcomings.  First, the U.S. strategy of 
focusing exclusively on diminishing the influence of the ASG focuses on the wrong 
target.  Direct U.S. military aid to date has been earmarked for use against the ASG 
only.197  The ASG poses little threat to the United States and is considered to be a minor 
player in the problem of terrorism in the southern Philippines.  In spite of the many 
connections the MILF has displayed with other international terrorist organizations, the 
United States, at the request of the Philippine government, has not identified the group as 
a terrorist organization.   
As a result, most terrorist groups in the southern Philippines retain most of the 
capabilities they had before that time.  The National Counterterrorism Center reports the 
Philippines currently ranks eleventh globally in fatalities by country due to terrorist 
attacks and ninth in kidnappings, arguably with a disproportionate share coming from the 
south.  Fatalities have remained relatively constant in terms of the ranking, but the 
number of fatalities has trended steadily upward, from 144 in 2005 to 241 in 2009.198  
Kidnappings, on the other hand, skyrocketed after 2005, primarily due to increased 
conflict between the government of the Philippines and the various separatists groups in 
the south.  In 2005, only 25 people were kidnapped.199  By 2007, however, nearly 500 
were kidnapped in that year alone.200  The numbers have subsided somewhat since then, 
 
                                                 
197 Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia; Analyzing Regional 
Security Strategies,” International Security (Winter 2008), 180. 
198 Compiled from NCTC:  National Counterterrorism Center, 2005 Report on Terrorism, April 11, 
2006, 15, NCTC:  National Counterterrorism Center, 2006 Report on Terrorism, April 30, 2007, 25, 
NCTC:  National Counterterrorism Center, 2007 Report on Terrorism, April 30, 2008, 26, NCTC:  
National Counterterrorism Center, 2008 Report on Terrorism, April 30, 2009, 26, and NCTC:  National 
Counterterrorism Center, 2009 Report on Terrorism, March 19, 2010, 18. 
199 NCTC:  National Counterterrorism Center, 2005 Report on Terrorism, April 11, 2006, 18. 
200 NCTC:  National Counterterrorism Center, 2007 Report on Terrorism, April 30, 2008, 29. 
 58
with 143 kidnapped in 2009, but U.S. involvement has yet to bring the numbers back to 
2005 levels.201  Given these numbers, U.S. military solutions implemented thus far seem 
to have had little effect in reducing the impact of Islamic militancy. 
The second major weakness concerns the lack of coordination between the 
military and nonmilitary parts of U.S. policy.  While the United States has dedicated 
millions of dollars to lure MILF members out of the organization and into stable jobs 
within larger Mindanao society, USAID has led this initiative without full coordination 
with U.S. military efforts.202  As a result, U.S.-trained Philippine forces often carry out 
missions against the same people USAID aims to convert.  Rampant corruption at the 
local level contributes to other problems as well.203  Government leaders line their 
pockets with much of the money given by USAID, depriving the larger population of the 
benefits the aid is designed to provide.  In many cases corrupt government officials can 
easily influence poorly paid and overworked military forces and law enforcement 
officials with the financial aid provided by the United States.  As a result, they often 
compete, sometimes violently, over jurisdiction because of the potential to profit from 
illegal activity there.204  Currently, military and law enforcement are easily susceptible to 
bribes from MILF and others to look the other way when criminal activity takes place, or 
to even join their cause against the government.   
Rather than increasing cooperation between military and economic assistance, the 
2011 State Department budget seems to represent further compartmentalization of efforts.  
The decision to shift support for the military to the Department of Defense makes sense, 
but military efforts should continue to contain State Department elements, especially 
USAID.  Additionally, the disparity in the budgets between the two departments, with the 
Defense Department funded at 210 times the level of the State Department creates an 
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“imbalance” in the ability of the State Department to keep up with the Defense 
Department’s goals.205  The Defense Department itself acknowledges the need to 
improve the capacity of the State Department in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, 
noting that “Years of war have proven how important it is for America’s civilian agencies 
to possess the resources…needed to operate alongside the U.S. Armed Forces during 
complex contingencies at home and abroad.”206  The population the United States hopes 
to win the hearts and minds of remains wary of a U.S. military presence regardless of its 
stated intent.  USAID, integrated with the military, has a better chance of moving public 
opinion toward the side of the government. 
Third, the United States’ approach has failed to address one of the conditions that 
enable terrorist activity to persist, namely corruption within the Philippine government.  
Government corruption by the Philippines appears to be one of the root causes that have 
bred terrorist activity in the ARMM.  For example, organized separatism did not begin 
until the occurrence of the Jabidah Massacre, which served as a focal point for diverse 
Muslim groups in the southern Philippines to rally against.  The American military 
strategy to train the Philippine military to take offensive action against insurgents fails to 
address the rampant corruption contributing to the problems today in Mindanao.207  In 
many cases, corrupt government officials can easily influence poorly paid and 
overworked military forces and law enforcement officials with the financial aid provided 
by the United States.   
These three U.S. policy weaknesses have been exacerbated by problems on the 
Philippine side.  First, the ARMM remains the most impoverished region in the entire 
country; across virtually every economic data point provided it ranks last in all regions of 
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the Philippines.208  This is particularly noticeable with respect to the relative deprivation 
of the ARMM compared to its neighboring Mindanao regions.  The Islamic militants 
easily contrast the conditions in ARMM with the neighboring regions in Mindanao to 
Muslims as a recruiting tool, citing the fact that the ARMM has the “worst poverty, 
income inequality, infant and maternal mortality rates, and literacy levels” in the 
country.209  For example, while the per capita GDP in the ARMM is the lowest in the 
country, at only 24 percent of the average for the Philippines, neighboring Northern 
Mindanao has the third highest regional per capita GDP, at 104 percent of the average.210  
Additionally, the GDP growth rate of the ARMM between 1985 and 2005 actually 
decreased an average of .9 percent annually, while neighboring Central Mindanao 
enjoyed the highest growth rate of all regions in the Philippines, at 6.6 percent 
annually.211  Philippine government policies have contributed to this.   
The ARMM has failed to produce the promised results.  It has not provided the 
independence to govern as promised, continues to deny promised representation in the 
national government and has not yet addressed land ownership issues.212  One 
explanation for this is that the transplanted Christian landowners vehemently resist efforts 
to grant land rights to the Muslims, and have significant clout in the national government 
preventing movement in this area.213  Locals continue to clash over land.  For example, in 
Maguindanao province a breakaway group of the MILF, the Lawless Moro-Islamic 
Liberation Front Group (LMG) attacked a barangay captain and Citizens Armed Forces 
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Geographic Unit (CAFGU) field commander over property disputes.214  Additionally, 25 
of 68 validated family militias operate in the ARMM, promoted by the government with 
weapons provisions or concessions.215  These militias have backfired on the central 
government, which originally encouraged them under President Arroyo, as a cost 
effective means of maintaining law and order.  Instead, they have usurped power and 
instilled their own radical version of law and order.216  As a result of these circumstances, 
the aid provided by the United States has failed to produce the expected results.  It simply 
does not get to the people that need it the most.   
Second, the Philippine government’s strategies may hinder American 
counterterrorism policies.  The government first entered into negotiations with the MILF 
in 1997.217  However, between 1997 and 2001 the government, while negotiating, often 
sent military forces into Mindanao and MILF strongholds in an effort to contain them, 
undermining the peace movements and acting as a de facto recruiting tool for the 
MILF.218  In 1997, the MILF began its campaign of violence shortly after the 
establishment of the ARMM, concluding the government’s peace process with the 
MNLF.  Negotiations with the MILF initially were intermittent and nonexistent during 
President Joseph Estrada’s term.  In 2000, President Estrada executed aggressive military 
operations against the 15,000 strong MILF, which ultimately failed to produce the desired 
effects; the military experienced significant losses while the MILF gained valuable 
training and experience.219  President Estrada’s policies created significant distrust on 
both sides that complicated the peace process later.   
                                                 
214 “Kapitan Samdan Sa Pag-atake Sa Mga Rebelding Moro,” Cebu Sun Star, January 14, 2010, 
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/davao/kapitan-samdan-sa-pag-atake-sa-mga-rebelding-moro. 
215 Solita Collas-Monsod.  “Calling A Spade….”  Business World.  January 28, 2010. 
216 Ruth Pollard.  “In the Shadow of Arroyo’s Warlords.”  Sydney Morning Herald.  December 12, 
2009. 
217 Ibid., 83. 
218 Astrid S. Tuminez, “This Land is Our Land:  Moro Ancestral Domain and its Implications for 
Peace and Development in the Southern Philippines,” SAIS Review, Vol. 27, No. 2, Summer–Fall 2007, 83. 
219 “Special Report:  Philippine Counter-Terrorism Campaign Faces a Challenge Unsuited to Major 
High-Tech Systems,” Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily (2002). 
 62
Following the resignation of President Estrada in 2001, the government resumed 
negotiations with the MILF, which has led to sporadic ceasefires and commencement of 
hostilities.  In 2001, the conflict stabilized when Malaysia entered into the peace process 
negotiations acting as a mediator, which signaled a stabilizing in the relationship between 
the government and the MILF.220  Manila offered significant concessions to the MILF, 
agreeing in 2007 to significantly expand the borders of the proposed Bangsamoro 
Juridical Entity (BJE), which provides for a primarily Muslim autonomous region in 
Mindanao.221  The BJE goes farther than the ARMM in granting autonomy to the region 
but requires amending the Philippine Constitution to make it legal.  However, the peace 
process fell apart again in 2008 when the Supreme Court declared the latest agreement 
unconstitutional, resulting in violence waged on both sides once again. 
As was the case with the MNLF in the mid-1990s, off-shoots of the MILF 
continue to engage in violence against the government.  For example, the government 
decided not to take action against rogue elements of the MILF that allowed JI to operate 
and train in Mindanao.222  Even though the MILF leadership has demonstrated to the 
government that these elements do not represent the group as a whole and they have 
made a concerted effort to stamp out this opposition, links between them perpetuate.  
This situation demonstrates that simply mollifying the MILF will not necessarily 
eradicate the larger problem of terrorism in the Philippines.   
Finally, the military and nonmilitary aspects of U.S. assistance appear piecemeal 
and unconnected to a broader strategy of regional stability.  The current approach targets 
a number of worthy areas, but does so without a comprehensive approach.  For example, 
USAID has built schools in areas where it believed it could safely, not necessarily in 
areas that need new schools.  Many military programs do not appear to be coordinated 
with programs that USAID and other organizations support.  American policies may not 
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have been as effective as they could have been because of lack of interagency 
coordination and execution rather than lack of funding.  Additionally, U.S. military 
policy has limits based on the Philippine Constitution which dictates that no foreign 
government can stage a permanent presence in the nation.  The temporary arrangement 
with U.S. military forces in the country has lasted more than eight years and the 
Philippine government increasingly faces pressure to eliminate the U.S. military footprint 
in keeping with the Constitution.  The apparently compartmentalized approach to these 
problems embraced by JSOTF-P, USAID, the government of the Philippines and other 
organizations hindered U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and, therefore, it was ineffective.   
The United States has also limited its involvement in the role its allies have 
played, which has resulted in attempts at solving the issues to have had limited results as 
well.  The international agreements implemented with ASEAN failed to address the root 
causes limiting cooperation between ASEAN nations.  Varying standards of living, ethnic 
diversity, religious diversity between the nations, and limited military and police 
capabilities have hindered full implementation of the agreements.223  As an example, it is 
difficult for countries like Indonesia and Malaysia with majority Muslim populations to 
strategically target extremists based on limited intelligence without alienating the masses.  
Additionally, Singapore has a thriving economy while those of Vietnam and the 
Philippines struggle by comparison.  The United States has the ability to level the playing 
field between the different nations, but has yet to act. 
Given the length of time the United States has had to implement this strategy, it 
may be time to acknowledge that it has likely resulted in attacking the symptoms and not 
the underlying problems.  Essentially, even if peace with the MILF does come about, and 
ASG is weakened to the point that it becomes irrelevant, that does not guarantee that 
some other breakaway group will not rise to replace these groups.  As long as the 
circumstances that bred the MILF and ASG remain, the problem is unlikely to be solved.  
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E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States should develop a comprehensive strategy in conjunction with 
the Philippines to combat the root causes that make Mindanao a safe haven for terrorists.  
To begin with, U.S. policy should expand military efforts beyond the ASG to, at a 
minimum, addressing the rogue elements of the MILF.  JSOTF-P, while training 
Philippine military forces in the area already, should continue to do so, but with a surge 
in Philippine military presence to secure the region and discontinue reliance on family 
militias.  At the same time, JSOTF-P should also train local law enforcement and 
operationalize the police force.  The U.S. military has enjoyed significant success doing 
this in the surge in Iraq, and with the Marines in Vietnam under the Combined Action 
Program (CAP) where they embedded with local military and law enforcement in 
villages, eventually winning the trust of the villagers and denying Vietcong valuable 
recruiting sources and staging bases.   
Along with a freer hand for the JSOTF-P, the United States should also increase 
the footprint of nonmilitary humanitarian agencies, especially USAID.  The latest State 
Department budget contains adequate resources for USAID.  Leadership within USAID 
and JSOTF-P must work more closely together in separatist hotbeds.  The JSOTF-P can 
enter these regions with Philippine military forces, clear out insurgents, establish safe 
zones, and guarantee the safety of USAID workers while they construct badly needed 
hospitals, schools and infrastructure.  A deliberate presence over a period of months will 
demonstrate to the local population that they can count on the government to perform its 
duties in securing their villages.  Once this is established, locals will return to their daily 
routines, recruiting into local police forces will increase and businesses will once again 
thrive, all of which will force the separatists into survival mode in the jungles, a lifestyle 
only the most hardcore will be willing to endure.  This method of counterinsurgency has 
demonstrated success in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan in the areas they have been tried.  
While all of those models had issues, most significantly the failure to persist, a host of 
leadership failures unrelated to the success of the CAP in Vietnam ultimately led to 
failure.  In Iraq in 2005 the Marines implemented a CAP program nearly identical to that 
initiated in Vietnam with remarkable results, especially in Fallujah where in a matter of 
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months they turned the corner on one of the most embedded insurgent groups in the 
country, with a platoon of Iraqi National Guard forces in the lead.224  This represents just 
one of many examples of tactics employed on the ground by U.S. forces utilizing local 
capabilities to turn the tide, in environments arguably much more difficult to operate in 
than the southern Philippines.  The southern Philippines is distinct from these in that the 
violence is much less comparatively, meaning USAID can go in more aggressively than it 
could in the other countries.  A program based on CAP principles in the Philippines 
would utilize local forces best equipped to gather intelligence on the ground and more 
quickly gain support from the local population, resulting in a snowball effect as military 
and police recruit additional locals into service against the separatists.  This program 
would also likely better position the Philippine government at the negotiating table in the 
ongoing peace process with the MILF. 
Additionally, the U.S. government should provide incentives in the form of higher 
wages and benefits to both military and law enforcement.  The United States could 
facilitate this in the same manner it increased salaries for military and police in 
Afghanistan through direct payments to members of those forces, which would ensure the 
money gets to the individuals it is intended for and does not wind up in the pockets of 
corrupt government officials.  Currently, military and police forces are easily susceptible 
to bribes from MILF and others to look the other way when criminal activity takes place, 
or to even join their cause against the government.  Higher salaries would force separatist 
groups to either substantially increase these payments, a prospect difficult to foresee 
given the dwindling funding resources as a result of U.S. efforts there, or it would force 
the separatists to come up with riskier, alternative strategies to achieve their objectives.   
Alternative strategies would likely involve direct contact with United States or Philippine 
military forces, a scenario advantageous for military forces since their greatest challenge 
is usually locating separatists. 
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In the spirit of multilateral cooperation, the United States should also facilitate the 
integration of efforts undertaken by other countries to improve circumstances in the 
southern Philippines.  Tying together these individual efforts into a single strategy will 
provide a synergy not seen in the history of that country.  It will show Filipinos that they 
have international support, and place increased pressure on the government to take the 
situation more seriously.  Japan, Australia, the United States, and others have collectively 
invested billions of dollars in the Philippines and all have a vested interest in seeing the 
conflict resolved.    
Ultimately, U.S. policy should focus efforts on fighting causes, not symptoms.  
The main characteristics that enable terrorism to flourish the southern Philippines are 
poverty, corruption, and an overreliance by the Philippine government on powerful 
families that dictate local government policies and maintain law and order with their 
family militias.  To that end, some local leaders have complained that their constituents 
have no desire to be part of an autonomous region, Zamboanga City in particular.225  
While the government cannot realistically expect unanimous support, the more universal 
it is, the more likely they can sustain peace.   
The United States should work with the Philippine government to grow the 
economy in the region.  For example, investment funds to properly irrigate rice fields, 
since only half of all rice fields have proper irrigation, would permanently increase rice 
production 50 percent per field (from two crops to three crops annually) and reduce 
reliance on seasonal rains in El Niño years when the country experiences below-average 
rainfall.  Less than 15 percent of the rice fields in the ARMM have irrigation systems in 
place, the lowest percentage of irrigation in the country and far below the national 
average of 45 percent.226  The United States should invest in a manner that circumvents 
the corrupt government officials, ensuring the aid actually gets to where it needs to go.  
These types of investments would be temporary in nature and provide a “hand up” to 
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farmers too poor to invest in the technology on their own.  It would also spur demand for 
jobs, offering employment opportunities to young men who often join terrorist 
organizations as a way to feed their families, not so much out of ideology.  
Since much of the recommended policy positions involved direct investment on 
the part of the United States, that should send a message to the Philippine government 
that they need to combat corruption.  Challenges abound to eradicate the corruption that 
exists with the humanitarian programs in place today.  Therefore, the United States and 
any other external body investing in the region should tie funds to performance measures, 
followed up with demands.  Using the example of the rice fields, demonstrating the 
effects of the money provided would be straightforward; if 100 acres costs $10,000 to 
irrigate, the United States should then follow the yields produced in the fields they 
funded for irrigation.  Direct grants to farmers from the granting agency could best enable 
this.  President Aquino based his election on reducing corruption and should now follow 
through.  This would signal to the international community that the government is serious 
about restoring its status as a key player in Southeast Asia.  Along with that, reducing 
corruption must involve elimination of clan militias that control vast expanses of the 
southern Philippines.  President Aquino can look to former Philippine President Ramon 
Magsaysay as a model of how to properly combat corruption and lead his country 
through similar trials.  Magsaysay successfully put down the Huk Rebellion in the 1950s 
through careful allocation of U.S. aid to increase pay for military members and ensuring 
they had basic provisions in rural areas, preventing them from alienating the local 
population there by stealing from the very people they had been dispatched to protect.227  
While the Huk Rebellion involved Communist insurgents against the Philippine 
government, in many ways the techniques used on both sides parallel those witnessed 
today.  Philippine leaders simply cannot expect to stabilize the country when it they have 
allowed this basic function of government to run amok.   
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While the Philippines continues to negotiate with MILF, it must take the steps 
necessary to make long-term peace happen, with pressure from the United States if 
necessary.  This will likely involve changes to the Philippine Constitution to facilitate the 
level of autonomy demanded by the MILF.  Given the fractious relationship with 
Muslims created by government policies, increased autonomy is appropriate and will 
allow the Muslims the level of independence needed to embrace their religious values 
and stabilize the region on their end.  The government has taken some steps to rebuild the 
bridges it destroyed decades ago, such as the peace agreement with the MNLF, and 
should use that and collaboration with local Christian groups as a catalyst to establish 
long term peace.   At the same time, the government must allow the resource rich ARMM 
to retain the profits derived from the region.  For decades, the central government has 
ensured profits from the area funnel to Manila, but then have trickled very little back to 
improve infrastructure and the local economy.  Autonomy must include allowing the 
local population to retain the profits from the work they do to harvest local resources.  
While this will reduce funds to government coffers, lucrative natural gas and oil deposits 
discovered off-shore in recent years should more than compensate for losses in the 
ARMM.  Stability in the southern Philippines will also serve to entice foreign investment, 
likely producing a “win-win” situation for the region and the central government. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The threat posed by terrorism in the Philippines to U.S. homeland security is more 
diverse and serious than the U.S. believes.  The U.S. has displayed a disproportionate 
focus on ASG while ignoring the threat posed by the MILF and without addressing the 
real grievances Muslims have held for decades.  The United States may find that focusing 
more attention on other threats besides ASG would be prudent and that pursuing long 
term peace with the MILF by addressing their grievances makes sense for the security of 
the United States and the Philippines, but only attacks the symptom if not followed up 
with broader regional stabilization plans to eradicate the constant influx of breakaway 
groups.  Muslims in the southern Philippines have grievances, such as corruption and a 
disparate level of poverty in comparison to the rest of the country, and have fought for 
decades to be heard.  However, the Philippine government and people have grown weary 
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of waging war against one another and support the ongoing negotiations.  Those 
negotiations are not expected to necessarily fix the root causes of the strife in the first 
place though.  It is likely that another organization would rise as the MILF is placated, in 
the same manner that the MILF rose at a time when the MNLF was placated by the 
government.   
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States appropriately carried the fight to the 
enemy.  However, the United States has implemented a near-sighted strategy in the 
Philippines, dealing with only one small piece of the greater international terrorist threat 
in the region that has been dubbed the second front in the global war on terror.  It has 
enjoyed some success but requires a broader, longer term outlook.  Given the proper 
strategy, the U.S. can successfully confront the second front, and win the war there, thus 
denying al Qaeda, and those who would seek to do the U.S. harm, a staging area it has 
relied upon for decades . The best chances for success though, likely lie in the integration 
of approaches used within the U.S. government, and with neighboring countries that have 
invested significant amounts of money.  These nations all have the same goal of 








Have the United States’ efforts to combat terrorism abroad enhanced homeland 
security?  The efforts put forth by the United States over the past nine years have been 
significant; they involved a sustained U.S. presence in the affected areas and cost U.S. 
taxpayers billions of dollars.  The second front in the global war on terrorism has not 
produced a direct attack on U.S. interests since 9/11.  The focus on the ASG has 
produced definitive results, but terrorist attacks in the region persist, threatening the 
stability of the Philippines and U.S. interests there.  Have these efforts in the southern 
Philippines made the U.S. homeland more secure?  If so, how have they done so?  While 
the United States has enjoyed some successes, clearly it has yet to confront the root 
causes of the problems in the southern Philippines.  While the United States aggressively 
pursued the ASG, as recently as 2008, a breakdown in the peace process talks between 
the Philippine government and the MILF resulted in displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of residents in the southern Philippines.  Another breakdown could result in 
having history repeat itself by leading to a new expansion of or a new proliferation of 
insurgent and terrorist groups, unless the United States adopts a more comprehensive 
strategy that addresses the root causes underlying the separatist movements.   
B. OVERVIEW 
Over a period of centuries, Muslims in the southern Philippines adopted a distinct 
identity separate from that ingrained into the rest of the population through more than 300 
years of Catholic influence resulting from Spanish colonial power.  Muslims in the 
Philippines believed they would realize their aspirations of an independent nation with 
the country’s liberation from Spain following the Spanish American War.  However, the 
conclusion of World War II produced a different outcome, and the young government 
floundered for decades in futile attempts to assimilate this unique population and 
convince them to adopt a national identity over their centuries old Muslim lineage.   
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Instead, the government of the Philippines engaged in a series of botched policies 
that further alienated the Muslim population from the rest of the country.  Eventually, 
these policies prompted some Muslims to organize against the government in efforts to 
gain for themselves what two imperial powers had failed to provide—independence.  
While the Philippines will not likely ever grant the southern Philippines complete 
independence, the violence waged by the separatists has produced significant successes 
from their perspective, especially with the 1996 establishment of the ARMM.  Extreme 
swings in government policies based on changing leadership have eroded the legitimacy 
of government agreements in the eyes of the Muslims as well.  Given the very mixed 
track record of the Philippine government, along with the United States’ own tattered 
history in the Philippines, it is unreasonable to expect that either can win over the Muslim 
population in the short term. 
Following decades of abstaining from involvement in domestic matters between 
the Philippine government and the Muslims, the United States once again found itself in 
the middle of the tumultuous relationship following 9/11.  Substantial evidence indicated 
that the southern Philippines were a hotbed of international terrorist activity and possibly 
the epicenter of the second front of the global war on terrorism.  As a result, the United 
States once again thrust military forces into the region as its standard tool of first resort in 
hopes of quickly resolving a crisis that had simmered for decades.  As it quickly 
discovered, however, circumstances presented a much more complex situation than 
originally realized. 
The United States has spent billions of dollars and committed thousands of 
military and civilian forces to resolve the problems in the southern Philippines, but it 
entered without a coherent strategy or full understanding of what was wrong and what 
needed to be done to fix the problems there.  The strategy, while well-meaning, was 
piecemeal and uncoordinated with interservice and international agencies.  This 
compartmentalized approach has served merely to shift the location, methods and players 
involved.  It has not severed the head from the snake as designed.  However, the United  
States has demonstrated the ability to quickly turn the tide in events similar to this and 
has the capacity to do so in this theater without significantly increasing its resource 
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commitment.  If the United States embraces the strategies it used successfully in Iraq 
during the surge to marginalize the separatists and synchronizes efforts already 
undertaken by USAID, the DoD and allied nations it stands a much better chance of 
gaining the support of the local population and permanently solving the crises that have 
plagued the southern Philippines for generations. 
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